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Security: Missing from the Northern Ireland Model

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The Northern Ireland model is best defined as the framing of the political endgame of Northern Ireland's conflict culminating in the 1998 Belfast Agreement, otherwise known as the Good Friday Agreement. The Northern Ireland model is popularly portrayed as a negotiated settlement. It focuses primarily on the bargain reached by Northern Irish political parties, assisted by British and Irish governments and mediated by US senator George Mitchell. Academics and officials alike use it to explain how the "Troubles" ended and peace was achieved. Conspicuously absent from this model is security. It also grossly understates the difficulty in dealing with a modern insurgency (the Provisionals) and leans too heavily toward skewed post-conflict thinking that views insurgents as "peacemakers" prevented from making peace because of a manifestly poor security response, particularly that of the police force and its intelligence agency (Special Branch). The perspective of politicians and diplomats who brokered the peace settlement prioritizes political negotiations at the expense of the security response; in so doing, the role of security is undermined and overlooked. Most contemporary academic works promote this outlook. Excluding security, however, thwarts a comprehensive analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict and renders any examination partial and unrepresentative. There is therefore a significant intellectual gap in our understanding of how peace was achieved, which this article redresses. Ultimately, it questions the Northern Ireland model's capacity to assist in other relevant conflict contexts in any practical sense by arguing that a strategy where security pushed as politics pulled brought about peace. In other words, security played a crucial part because it forced the main protagonists into a situation out of which the Belfast Agreement emerged.

Keywords: Conflict, Insurgency, Intelligence, Provisionals, Police, Special Branch, Security, Terrorism

INTRODUCTION

This article looks at Northern Ireland's conflict (1969–1998) as an irregular war, studying the main threat as an insurgency and the response of the state as a counterinsurgency. It is a critical examination of the extant literature and

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a rigorous approach to interviews, field notes, and documents, based on recent doctoral research that employed a grounded theory approach. This involved interviews with mostly former Royal Ulster Constabulary Special Branch (RUCSB) officers, almost all of who worked on police professionalization programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, some US military personnel, senior Iraqi police officers, and British Army Special Forces. New information gleaned presents a practitioner's perspective, providing a representative analysis of the RUCSB. Key interviews are US General David Petraeus and British Army Colonel (retired) Tim Collins. Relevant analogies with current conflicts are included as a means of providing a contemporary assessment of Northern Ireland's conflict. Political developments during the conflict are also illustrated. The combination serves to frame the wider context.

The insurgency in Northern Ireland was not popularly supported. Aware of this, its leaders adopted a strategic and organizational structure to compensate for its lack of constituency. A cellular-based network of 500 activists enabled a prolonged terrorist campaign from the mid-1970s onward—250 inside Northern Ireland and 250 OTRs (On-The-Runs) outside Northern Ireland's jurisdiction in the Republic of Ireland. The article adopts a security-oriented approach and argues that an arrest-centric security effort under police primacy undermined the strategy of the main protagonists—the Provisional IRA. Or precisely: the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). In turn, this provided PIRA's political partner (Provisional Sinn Féin – PSF) with a face-saving detour into democratic politics through the Belfast Agreement of 1998.

It was a case of “push and pull,” where security pushed the Provisional movement toward politics as politics pulled insurgents toward a permanent cessation of hostilities. In other words, significantly contributing to the defeat of the military arm of the insurgency (PIRA) was an effective security effort dominated, for the most part, by Special Branch (SB) under police primacy (1977–1998). This left the insurgency's political arm (PSF) intact, creating the conditions for the political endgame and 1998 Peace Accord. It is this short final period of political negotiation and mediation from the first PIRA ceasefire in 1994 until 1998 that defines the conventional perception of the Northern Ireland model popularly promoted on the world stage. Conspicuously absent is the role the security strategy played in facilitating the peace prior to political negotiations taking place. The ending also highlights the insurgency's strategic failure to fulfill its headline aim of uniting Ireland through a prolonged terrorist campaign conducted by the PIRA. The key question is therefore quite obvious: Why is this? That is, if security partnered politics to defeat the main protagonists (the insurgent network), thereby ending the conflict, why does the Northern Ireland model popularly promoted internationally exclude the security element?

The article's underlying claim is that the existing configuration of the Northern Ireland model underplays the security contribution to peace, particularly the intelligence aspect, and that this is the dominant viewpoint that has emerged in recent times. Failing to acknowledge the security element that facilitated the brokering of the peace agreement undermines the ability to effectively advocate for replicating the Northern Ireland model elsewhere.

SECURITY: DEFINED BY EARLY MISTAKES

The history of the conflict can be charted through a series of security-related policies. Within the security agencies, the main opponent to introducing one of the most influential security policies, that of internment in 1971, was Special Branch (SB). As Northern Ireland Secretary of State Merlyn Rees observed, "I hardly needed to be told that the police had been against detention from the beginning. It had been imposed on them."¹ Internment was important because it was the immediate security response to increased levels of violence. Of this, a former SB officer states:

We had reported on what we were being told, and you must remember that this was nationalists and republicans we were getting this from. . . . We were not fully prepared and it was too one-sided. Yes, we all knew the Provos were now the major threat and the Officials [Official IRA] were still there, or thereabouts, but it was really important to also deal with the loyalists, even though it was a much smaller threat, and more importantly to show nationalists that we were dealing with it.²

SB was acutely aware that even though 95 percent of killings conducted by militants in the 20 months preceding internment were by PIRA, it was important to include both sides. Initial arrests were from one specific community, and, as a result, internment has been popularly perceived as sectarian.³ That the European Commission on Human Rights found no discrimination in applying the powers of detention was lost.⁴ The introduction of internment was ill advised as SB had warned. Special Branch was aware that, as an agency, it knew what it did not know and communicated this to a Unionist government at Stormont and to the Army (who were in charge of security). At this early juncture, however, SB had neither the resources to deal with the threat faced, nor the political leverage to persuade Stormont or London that introducing internment at that time and in the manner planned was a mistake.

The early confusion caused by Army primacy (1969–1976) compounded matters, as SB was implicated in harsh interrogations.⁵ The techniques employed in a small number of cases promptly and rightly ceased, but the negative stereotyping of SB persisted.⁶ Yet harsh interrogations ran counter to the cooperative traditional approach of SB strategy, which was designed to convince terrorist suspects to turn against their terrorist organizations.⁷

Moreover, SB contained more officers from the minority community than any other branch of the RUC and, as a result, had the greatest leverage of any part of the RUC in the context of addressing and dealing with the minority community and the problems it faced. The leadership of the Provisionals feared it more than any other security measure.

Within the RUC, however, the cooperative approach of SB attracted suspicion. Uniform and CID officers struggled to see how SB detectives could adopt a cooperative strategy of befriending terrorists rather than a coercive approach. Other factors undermined the SB strategy: the *ultra vires* response of the “B” Specials (an auxiliary arm of the police) to civil protests,⁸ the privileged relationship between the police and the devolved government at Stormont (controlled for 50 years by the political representatives of the majority community),⁹ and the predominantly Protestant police’s one-sided makeup (approximately 90 percent Protestant and 10 percent Catholic) in a population of approximately 60 percent Protestant and 40 percent Catholic.¹⁰ Bloody Sunday in 1972 was a defining moment. Fourteen innocent civilians (all from the minority community) were shot dead by the Army during an anti-internment rally, the outcome the local police uniform commander Frank Lagan had feared in advising the Army against its planned response.¹¹ Lagan’s thinking reflected the guidance he was given by SB.¹²

In short, the state’s initial response to civil unrest and a new terrorist threat compounded the problem. The flawed response shattered what little confidence the minority community had in the police, which, in turn, played into the hands of militants. That said, the first few months aside, internment ran for four years until 1975 and produced a valuable security dividend that inflicted a devastating blow on the Provisionals. Toward the end, all the right people were being detained, unlike the shambles at the start. The difficulty was that, politically, it was a disaster.

Incidents such as Bloody Sunday, however, are not unique to Northern Ireland. US soldiers shot dead 15 Iraqi civilians and wounded 65 more at a protest rally in Fallujah, Iraq in 2003.¹³ Soon afterward, a cleric in a mosque in Fallujah praised the first serious attack on US troops by insurgents.¹⁴ For the minority Sunni Arab community, US soldiers and those supporting them were now perceived as the enemy.¹⁵ The parallels persist—in broader terms, the initial response of the United States in Iraq replicates the lack of preparedness of the British Army in Northern Ireland.¹⁶ US operational commanders had little insight into British Army and security errors in Northern Ireland 30 years earlier because the Northern Ireland model fails to account for security lessons learned. As the report of the House of Commons Defence Committee observes, the government does not have an official “lessons learned” account of the Northern Ireland security response.¹⁷

SO WHAT IS A FAIR REPRESENTATION OF SECURITY?

Early mistakes were fully exploited by PSF propagandists who constantly reinforced existing negative stereotypes of both the police and the Army. Despite security improving in subsequent years, the minority community still perceived the police—particularly SB—negatively. The perspective obscures an accurate representation of the security response, better seen when assessing the factual outcomes over the entirety of the conflict. This can be broadly gauged from three angles. First, in incidents involving lethal force the RUC was responsible for roughly two killings per year—43 between 1969 and 1998, or 1 percent of all deaths. It is almost certain that this is lower than many Western police forces who have not experienced a conflict. And for a somewhat similar environment in another divided society, Rio de Janeiro, the police killed 250 times this number in organized crime–related incidents in 2008, when adjusted to reflect Northern Ireland’s population.¹⁸ Also, the Catholic population increased by 8.5 percent over the life of the conflict, making claims of repressive policing difficult to substantiate.¹⁹ In contrast, in Iraq 8 percent of the prewar population was displaced during the Iraq conflict (2003–2009).²⁰ The point is that populations suffering repressive security measures tend to decrease as people flee to neighboring states. While Northern Ireland was not a totalitarian regime, PSF routinely projected this view, its president labeling Northern Ireland Secretary of State Roy Mason as the “Little Labour Fuhrer” who “unleashed the SAS and the torturers within the RUC.”²¹ Journalists such as Cadwallader and academics such as Ellison and Smyth have also associated the RUC with the Nazis.²² The RUC—though flawed—did not represent a repressive force akin to the Nazis nor did it afford the label torturers.

In Northern Ireland, a member of the Security Forces was three times more likely to be killed than an insurgent—a 3:1 counterinsurgent/insurgent casualty ratio.²³ As General Petraeus observed, no US commander or US government would countenance this ratio. In Iraq, the ratios were opposite—1:4.²⁴ Last, in Northern Ireland insurgents committed approximately 60 percent of all killings (2,152).²⁵ Of these, the “Surgeon” was in charge of a PIRA cross-border unit responsible for 300 murders, of which it is claimed he committed 70.²⁶ That is, one insurgent committed 39 percent more killings than the entire Police Force. Collectively and individually, insurgents were the main protagonists. Considering these broad outcomes, it is unsurprising that Chasdi’s comparative study of seven recent irregular wars rates Northern Ireland’s security response as the most human rights compliant.²⁷

SECURITY: MASLOW’S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS

The Northern Ireland model thinking as it stands parallels Clinton’s thinking in brokering a peace deal, as well as that of various Irish premiers and political

leaders, and, essentially, that of the model as a whole is in stark contrast to that of the United States when its security was similarly threatened.²⁸ Clinton's successor President George W. Bush and the US administration prioritized security in the context of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror.²⁹ Sharing this outlook are British Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990) and John Major (1990–1997), as well as Northern Ireland Secretary of State William Whitelaw (1972–1973), Merlynn Rees (1974–1976), and Roy Mason (1976–1979).³⁰ Irish premier Garret Fitzgerald also acknowledged the primacy of security as a facet of peace, evident in 1985's Anglo-Irish Agreement that focused heavily on security.³¹ Fitzgerald recognized the need to secure a security pact in order to better support a political process in the longer term. In contrast, the Belfast Agreement—which replaced it—makes no mention of security in this context, arguably because the security parameters of the British and Irish states were secured in the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. This is not to undermine the contribution of Clinton, Blair, and others or to promote a purely security-driven or “hard power” approach; rather, it is to illustrate that there is a distinct difference between dealing with a terrorist threat at its peak and when it has subsided. Of the latter, the only local political leader in the peace talks who acknowledged this is the Ulster Unionist Party leader David Trimble (unionism being the traditional supporter of policing and security).³² Trimble recognized that without an effective security effort, there would have been no political endgame, whereas the rest ignored or downplayed this aspect. The difficulty unionism faced in the Belfast Agreement was historic divisions within it between hardliners and reformers. This subsequently hindered its ability to contest the nationalist perspective, particularly in the power-sharing arrangement that evolved.

Setting aside politics, the experiences of practitioners in irregular wars since are instructive. In this regard, Petraeus's thinking is insightful:

It's like Maslow's Hierarchy of needs, until you get security nothing else much matters other than survival.³³

Petraeus makes it quite clear that “you have to have a security foundation upon which all elements depend. So until you build a sufficient security foundation,” he concludes, politics and economics are largely irrelevant.³⁴ The Chief Constable's Annual Report (1972) quantifies why:

Apart from incidents evolving from riot situations, direct attacks were made on police personnel on approximately three thousand occasions, over six hundred of which involved the use of firearms or explosives. Police stations were attacked on no less than two hundred and sixty occasions, over two hundred of which involved the use of rockets and firearms.

Northern Ireland Prime Minister Brian Faulkner put it into the following context:

All of this was happening in a small province of only 1.5 million people. Perhaps it can be better grasped by translating it into proportionate figures for the whole of the United Kingdom. Thus it would have meant over 2,000 dead, and in seven months 11,000 bombings, 11,600 shootings and 22,000 people injured.³⁵

Faulkner used the analogy to show that terrorist violence had prevented the normal functioning of political and civic life.

THE MAIN PROTAGONIST: STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND INTENT

If we accept that security is crucial to countering an insurgency, the mechanisms of the security approach adopted and the impact on regulating the conflict are significant. With this in mind, the real question is, What did the security effort look like and how effective was it? To gauge this, it is necessary to first look at the threat. In this regard Smith, O'Brien, Moloney, and Alonso are insightful studies of the Provisionals.³⁶ However, since 9/11 our understanding of the Provisionals has also benefited from literature, such as *The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, that classifies the Provisionals as an "urban insurgency" the same as "certain Latin American groups, and some Islamic extremist groups in Iraq." It states that these groups are not popularly supported and use terrorist tactics to

sow disorder; incite sectarian violence; weaken the government; intimidate the population; kill government and opposition leaders; fix and intimidate police and military forces, limiting their ability to respond to attacks.³⁷

Kilcullen argues that insurgents use terrorism within a joint political and military strategy. He shows that insurgents who renounce violence to pursue their objectives through political means are often accepted into government, singling out Gerry Adams to prove his point.³⁸ In broad terms, insurgency is a combination of terrorism and politics. The PIRA was the terrorist aspect and PSF the political. Hence, the "PIRA/PSF" or "Provisionals" describe the full insurgent network.

Specific to starting a conflict, Galula's seminal work and Kilcullen's recent account both illustrate that the Provisionals started an insurgency in December 1969.³⁹ Steven Metz, a research professor of the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, points out that insurgency is a strategy "that seeks to deliberately extend the conflict."⁴⁰ He further argues, "It is more accurate to treat terrorism as a tactic or operational method which can be used in a variety of strategies, including a strategy of insurgency."⁴¹

Therefore, the Northern Irish conflict was never going to be a short affair, conforming to the protracted nature of insurgency that Hammes notes is measured in decades as opposed to months or years.⁴² To this end, PIRA's first Chief of Staff, Seán MacStiofáin, copied Mao's long war strategy.⁴³ Implementation complied with Metz showing that insurgents use terrorism heavily in the opening stages in order to "awaken" supporters and attract them to the cause, after which the campaign settles down.⁴⁴ MacStiofáin's strategy was revised in the mid-1970s when the Provisionals' leadership privately prepared for a "twenty-year conflict."⁴⁵ The revised strategy took account of the Provisionals having no popular support. Reference to a long war strategy as if it newly emerged in the mid-1970s illustrates that traditional works on the conflict such as O'Brien miss the point that the Provisionals were condemned to pursuing a long war by the very fact that they began an insurgency.⁴⁶ For the first five to six years the Provisionals miscalculated the length and the gravity of the engagement and, as O'Brien points out, worked under the misguided belief that victory would come quickly.⁴⁷ The Special Branch Annual Report (1973) shows PIRA intent:

This decision to escalate violence had been taken in mid-January at a meeting of PIRA leaders in Eire. At this it was obvious that the Provisionals in the North were highly critical of their Southern counterparts and they forced through a policy decision whereby in future the Northern Units would finance their operations locally and that the controversial use of car bombs would continue.

The report concludes that the PIRA had embarked on a "full-scale campaign of guerrilla warfare," further stating:

In August intelligence indicated that it was the intention of the Provisional I.R.A. to promote sectarian tension in Belfast. In this connection a number of serious attacks by explosives took place in strong Protestant areas of the City.

A sectarian strain in the Provisionals, particularly in killing Protestants along the border, resembled IRA atrocities during the Anglo-Irish Conflict.⁴⁸ Petraeus, Nagl and Amos, and Galula, include civil war as a feature of insurgency, described in a Northern Irish context by Townsend as a "latent Civil War."⁴⁹ Despite claiming that it was defending the minority community, PIRA was the aggressor and uncaring of how violence affected this community other than when it dented its limited support. Provoking loyalist reprisals suited its purpose as this allowed its propagandists to blame the abstract specter of SB for being behind them, the forerunner of the "collusion" accusation that was to gain greater notoriety post-conflict.⁵⁰ Demonstrating the same intent in the late 1980s is PIRA's connection with Colonel Gaddafi that left it better armed than many third world nations.⁵¹

As with the IRA in the Anglo-Irish Conflict (1919–1921), where IRA leader Michael Collins considered the police "the cement that held the British presence in Ireland together,"⁵² the PIRA also deemed locally recruited police

their greatest threat, particularly SB. This is evident from GHQ Directive, General Order No. 1 (September 6, 1973) as amended by the Provisional Army Council (PAC) that updated and formalized earlier directives.⁵³ It details the penalty imposed for talking and not reporting this fact is to be “dismissed with ignominy” or charged with “treachery” and is the outworking of the PIRA/PSF’s congenital fear of SB. General Order No. 1 resulted in at least 78 killings (73 Catholics and 5 Protestants) of suspected collaborators. This outstripped loyalist paramilitaries by four to one and is 73 percent more than the total deaths caused by the police.⁵⁴ Also, the Provisionals had a 100 percent record in executing, often after torture, all Security Force personnel taken prisoner, exceeding the figure of al-Qaeda in Iraq.⁵⁵

Supplementing General Order No. 1 was counter-societies, a modernization of republican courts/policing from the early 1900s.⁵⁶ A secret communiqué from 4th Battalion PIRA (Maze Prison) to PSF HQ in Belfast in 1975 outlines its purpose:

The success or failure of this Brit strategy [criminalisation] will depend on our ability to adopt a strategy which will link us more closely with our base of support and that any attack on the Republican Movement will be seen clearly as an attack on the Nationalist people as a whole.⁵⁷

This modernized the passive and complicit attitudes Galula writes about. He sees the aim of selective terrorism is to isolate the police from the community, to involve the community in the struggle, and to “obtain as a minimum its passive complicity.” Galula correlates this to the killing of local police who insurgents promote as the enemy.⁵⁸ Another element was punishments dispensed, usually by appointment, which ranged from physical assault to execution. The Provisionals promoted this as a community service. Former British Army Colonel and SAS officer Tim Collins describes it as a “spectrum of subversion.” He views PSF Advice Centres as:

Alternate police stations where torture and murder were often planned. Criminality was simply part of their DNA. It was not that they did not see anything wrong with it, they did. Moreover, they took a perverse delight in holding everyone else to account and regarded the law and humanity itself as a public convenience they used at their will.⁵⁹

Toolis notes that a claim culture emerged in republican communities wherein civil litigation against the state was institutionalized.⁶⁰ A central aspect of this, according to former officers, was false complaints against the police. Another was massive electoral fraud by PSF.⁶¹ Essentially, counter-societies legalized lawlessness and maintained the conditions for revolutionary forces to keep control over the socially and economically deprived element of the minority community. This drew the poorest in the minority community closer to the insurgency, thereby making them complicit in legitimizing criminality. Of the

passive element, in broad terms this was constitutionalists within the minority community represented largely by the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). The Provisionals correctly calculated that politically, the SDLP would not oppose how PSF negatively promoted the police, as this would have been electorally unprofitable. Equally, PSF used the threat of PIRA violence to intimidate opponents. A longstanding loathing of the British approach and early security failings made this social cohesion easier to accomplish.⁶² It was an uncomfortable dilemma for constitutional nationalists that Eveleigh summarizes by saying that while the bulk of the minority community “thoroughly disliked the bombing and murdering by the IRA, they were not prepared to cooperate with the forces of the Crown to destroy the IRA.”⁶³ Former SDLP politician Brid Rodgers confirmed this in 2013 when she related that moderates like her from the minority community were torn between sympathizing with the Provisionals and seeing them as criminals.⁶⁴ The difficulty people such as Rodgers faced (who totally opposed PIRA violence) was that the militant fringe of PSF restricted them from fully endorsing the police. That is, the ethno-nationalist character of the Provisionals ensured ethnicity was the main determining factor at election time.⁶⁵

Helping our understanding of how nationalist public opinion was conditioned against the police is Townshend identifying the “Dirty War syndrome” from the Anglo-Irish Conflict. IRA/Sinn Féin propagandists conceived it in order to influence the press into printing factually inaccurate accounts designed to tarnish the security response.⁶⁶ PSF updated this. They chose a respectable third party, either a front organization under its direct control such as a Relatives Group that promoted the republican version of victimhood; an organization sympathetic to its aims, such as a Civil Liberties group, NGO, or other Socialist party, such as the Communist Party of Ireland; or individuals, such as journalists. SB training material in 1976 called it the “credibility gap,” explaining that the PSF contained accomplished propagandists who were:

fully appreciative of how easily a lie can be propagated and then sustained and how difficult it is to counter with the truth; the more so where the lie is simple and sensational and the truth complex and boring, where the whole situation is complicated by legal limitations which largely favour the accuser not the accused and where the situation is populated with those who have concealed sympathies and bias masquerading as the impartial and objective.

Modern theorists, such as Betz, show that the center of gravity of current conflicts is how they are “mediatized.” Betz argues that the perception constructed by media is more important than the material actuality, highlighting that al-Qaeda believes this perception comprises half the battle.⁶⁷ An internal press statement (October 27, 1977) by Chief Constable Sir Ken Newman complained about this. Newman believed that certain negative media reporting of the Police was unfairly misrepresentative and detrimental to public safety,

stability operations, and the safety of the police and Army. Petraeus's experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan mirrored Newman's.⁶⁸ In short, PSF shaped the popular perception of policing and security.

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT STRATEGY: A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY

Ending the conflict therefore hinged on defeating the PIRA—the main protagonist.⁶⁹ Ryder shows that this was the primary aim of the police, which was the antithesis of PSF promoting the PIRA as “defenders.” In 1976 Northern Ireland Secretary of State Merlynn Rees convened a Ministerial Committee chaired by John Bourn (Northern Ireland Office), including senior police and Army representatives in what is known as the “Way Ahead” or Bourn Report (1976). Bourn's working group reviewed the broad “threat to law and order” and the “need for police acceptance,” which entailed a significant increase in the size of the police.⁷⁰ It constructed a reformed rule of law approach where the police oversaw the criminalization of the insurgency and terrorism in general, of which Ulsterization was a key feature.⁷¹ It was an internal security solution designed to increase stability and restore normality via police primacy. This was updated by the Report of the Working Group to Consider Progress on Security Policy (1978). It conceived a strategy and implementation plan of how a permanent police presence could be maintained in hostile, semi-hostile, and non-hostile environments, their function in each environment, and how this could contribute to an overall normalization effort.

Not that General Petraeus or any other US official was aware of this at the time, but the strategy conceived in 1976–1978 for Northern Ireland's conflict was remarkably similar to what he and his senior team conceived for conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan almost three decades later.⁷² Again, this reinforces the unintended consequences of excluding security from the Northern Ireland model.

This strategy was operationalized primarily through framework operations—routine patrols by the regular Security Forces.⁷³ Covert police and Army operations ran in tandem to these patrols. The purpose was to reassure the majority of society (who were law-abiding citizens) and expand normal policing into as many areas as possible, especially the most hostile areas, while being sensitive to community needs. The overarching aim was to increase support for the government and reduce support for terrorist groups (republican and loyalist). Thatcher shows that defeating the main protagonist (PIRA) was key to the strategy's success:

The IRA [PIRA] are the core of the terrorist problem; their counterparts on the Protestant side would probably disappear if the IRA [PIRA] could be beaten.⁷⁴

To achieve this, she observed that (1) constitutionalists from the minority community reject the Provisionals and support constitutional institutions;

(2) PIRA/PSF is deprived of international support—Irish-America and Libya; and (3) Anglo–Irish relations need to be carefully managed.⁷⁵ The imperative was a security platform, of which Dublin’s contribution is crucial. To ensure this, Thatcher made limited concessions to the Republic, with the ultimate goal of producing a devolved government acceptable to both communities.⁷⁶ She also opened up a secret backchannel with the Provisionals.⁷⁷ Political initiatives and secret dialogue in tandem with the Internal Security Solution was the whole of government strategy. However, the political aspect in the form of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement brought no visible improvement on cross-border security. If anything, it deteriorated.⁷⁸ Nonetheless, it did sanction greater cross-border security cooperation, which resulted in closer working relationships, particularly between SBs. Thatcher and Fitzgerald had designed the broad template for the eventual Belfast Agreement, of which security was a crucial element.

POLICE PRIMACY: 1977–1998

Police primacy was restored in 1977, but it was not until the early 1980s that SB dominance emerged.⁷⁹ Prior to this and after internment finished, traditional investigative policing methods were implemented—Crime Squads and Converted Terrorists (supergrasses). However, as with the Gardiner Report (1975)⁸⁰ ending internment, the Bennet Report (1979)⁸¹ ended Crime Squads and a series of adverse court decisions ended Converted Terrorists.⁸² These were the major landscape changes affecting security. Both initiatives were unable to withstand a sophisticated PSF propaganda approach designed to exploit the sensitivities of a liberal democracy.

The Special Branch Annual Report (1971) notes, “The problems of the PIRA caused by continuing attrition by the Security Forces was being exacerbated by internal dissention.” Splits at the highest levels in 1971–1975 reflected deterioration in PIRA morale in Belfast. As one former SB officer states, “Members felt abandoned by a leadership that sought refuge in the Republic.”⁸³ Hennessey’s analysis of internment concludes that, relieved of the “cumbersome normal legal framework,” the Security Forces were devastating the Provisionals.⁸⁴ Even PIRA leaders Martin McGuinness and Billy McKee believed the security approach had brought the PIRA to the jaws of defeat.⁸⁵ It reinforces an earlier point. That is, had internment involved both communities and waited until sufficient intelligence was available before being introduced (thereby drastically reducing the number of innocent civilians detained), as SB advised, it would have proved less contentious and communally divisive and provided more political room for the Provisionals to maneuver.

PIRA despondency resulted in its 1974–1975 ceasefire, where the Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Merlyn Rees, outlines that at this time he was

advised the “Provisional IRA were in a mood to move from violence.”⁸⁶ Senior NIO official (Frank Cooper) engaged with the PIRA/PSF leadership, but “he got no further than merely clarifying British policy.”⁸⁷ Rees had previously been involved in secret talks with PIRA in Dublin in 1972 that also ended in failure.⁸⁸

The leadership of the Provisionals opposed any ceasefire.⁸⁹ In this regard, SB assessed the Official IRA leadership as far more politically advanced than its rival (PIRA). Or as one former SB officer puts it, “when you talk to old time IRA they refer to the Provos as the 69ers, and generally that they [the Provisionals] didn’t have a political thought in their head at that time.”⁹⁰ The point being made is this: Had the Gardiner report not ended internment (notwithstanding the disastrous way it was initially implemented and how this increased levels of violence), it is very probable the PIRA would have been defeated, thereby creating the conditions for its political partner (PSF) to enter into a political settlement (the same is true of the Crime Squad initiative). The main problem, however, was that the political immaturity of the Provisionals’ leadership worked against them partaking in any form of negotiated settlement. Neatly distilling this is deputy SDLP leader Seamus Mallon referring to the Belfast Agreement as “Sunningdale for slow learners” (Sunningdale having been a power-sharing experiment in 1973–1974).⁹¹ Mallon was emphasizing the same conditions that produced the Belfast Agreement existed 20 years previously.

As was the case with internment, none of these security initiatives were correspondingly implemented in the Republic, despite Dublin having previously introduced internment in harmony with Stormont and successfully ending the IRA Border Campaign (1956–1962).⁹² Traditional investigative-led policing methods had failed, highlighting the fallacy that “normal” policing (in itself) was capable of withstanding the threat. The clearest example of this is RUC Chief Constable Sir Arthur Young (1969–1970) implementing the Hunt Report (1969)⁹³—the Westminster Police model (unarmed British Bobby). According to Sinclair, constitutionalists of the minority community unduly influenced Young, further pointing out that, while his intent was admirable, it was questionable in the tumult of civil unrest and ultimately failed.⁹⁴ Young’s difficulty was that the Westminster Police model relies on policing by consent, consent being what the minority community withheld. Withholding consent for the police will inevitably impede normal policing.

Because of this and insurgent terrorism, the only police option left by the early 1980s was SB, and quite quickly it had to withstand the Stalker (1984) “shoot-to-kill” and “force within a force” accusations and the Stevens (1989) “collusion” claims against it. Yet, despite Stalker and Stevens impeding the intelligence attack, neither provoked a landscape change like Gardiner (1975) or Bennet (1979).⁹⁵ This is hugely important, as it was the first instance of substantive continuity in a security initiative.

The PIRA/PSF's problem was that the formula they used to successfully eliminate previous security initiatives (sophisticated propaganda influencing respectable third parties to trigger an inquiry) failed against SB. The reflex was 1981's Hunger Strikes, when the Provisionals' leadership contrived a situation guaranteed to cause public disorder and retrieve lost support. This followed 4th Battalion PIRA doctrine about any attack (ideological or physical) on republicans being exploited to galvanize the wider nationalist community, which is what happened. The aim was to undermine a criminalization policy that underpinned the intelligence-led security response. However, Thatcher was unflinching. She maintained that all paramilitary insurgent and loyalist violence was terrorist crime and not political in nature.⁹⁶ The significance of this is not that it marks the point where the political element of the insurgency took over from the military (although this is significant), but that it explains why the Provisionals were forced into this action in the first place. Ultimately, it was only delaying the inevitable—defeat of the PIRA. And it would be shortsighted to think that the permanent leadership of the Provisionals were not aware of these changes.

THE STRUCTURE OF SPECIAL BRANCH

The Special Branch Police Intelligence Model originated with the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), who positioned intelligence central to its operational effectiveness.⁹⁷ A main quality of the RIC Police Model, of which the RUC is its update, was that it could combine normal policing with security policing and shift the emphasis from one to the other when required.⁹⁸ It was based on a unitary police force maintaining a permanent police presence throughout the country. The organizational composition entailed being based at frontline sites, which meant it was ideal for a modern conflict.⁹⁹ It was very small (3 to 7 percent of the RUC between 1969 and 1998) and elitist and produced, by far, the majority of intelligence.

The Special Branch Annual Report (1971) identifies the workload SB was tasked with managing in showing just under 100 frontline officers were responsible for 23,781 vetting enquiries; 22,118 covert investigations on organizations and individuals of security interest; 3,976 reports on information obtained by individual officers; 1,978 observations; 4,818 contacts with sources; 2,092 parades, meetings, etc. attended; and 2,292 protective security duties. The son of a Special Branch officer recalls, "We hardly saw dad when we were growing up. He was always at work."¹⁰⁰ Long working days (often 16 hours with the other 8 hours on call) seven days a week for months on end were routine. As resources increased in later years, so, too, did the range of responsibilities. Connectedly, most literature overestimates the operational capacity of covert resources. Urban, for example, and Ellison and Smyth claim that in 1980 the

Det (Army surveillance) total was 300 and E4A (Police surveillance) 100.¹⁰¹ These are double the figures contained in an internal report.¹⁰²

Nearly all resources were in frontline posts, which left few back-office staff. The cost of this being, removing frontline resources to back offices would have reduced the number of lives saved but produced a surplus layer of bureaucracy dedicated to protecting corporate reputation typical of modern government organizations, thereby producing the records (e.g., contemporaneous notes, policy logs) retrospective inquiries criticize it for not having. Significantly, the standard of record keeping was better than CID's and, in all probability, surpassed its counterparts in the UK and Republic. One must keep this (record keeping) in mind, and also that policing in general at this time was an oral culture, when the "collusion" definition is examined later in the article.

Section 2 of the RUC Code shows SB was under the same central command as the rest of the RUC and that it was inappropriate for local Uniform/Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to have operational control over Divisional SB. It also shows that at the same time it liaised closely with Uniform and CID while recognizing its effectiveness at this local level. This conformed to national practice. Contrary to popular belief, it was not controlled by MI5.¹⁰³ Neither was it the "force within a force" that Stalker claims.¹⁰⁴ Rather, the intellectual capital, technical expertise, and funding of MI5 was used to professionalize the intelligence-gathering function and general intelligence machinery. The relationship with MI5 was very good. The same generally applies to British Army Special Forces with SB surveillance and armed response teams.

SB's organizational composition and culture differed from Military Intelligence, primarily because it had intimate local knowledge. Its unorthodoxy (prioritizing prevention above detection—a change in emphasis rather than principle) also set it apart from CID. Of note, SB was much smaller than Military Intelligence and CID. Again, unlike CID, SB employed tactical patience. That is, it also considered the long-term view as opposed to an exclusive focus on short-termism typical of traditional criminal investigations. This meant that in pursuit of a longer criminal justice strategy, not every evidence-gathering opportunity was taken. Sanders epitomizes how it was viewed by Military Intelligence, and Moran shows how CID viewed it without either fully taking cognizance of the other's position or SB's capacity to deliver on these expectations.¹⁰⁵ In its traditional intelligence-gathering role, they show SB had to contend with two strong philosophies (CID and Military Intelligence) pulling it in opposite directions—CID toward investigations and the Military toward their version of intelligence. Moran and Sanders, however, overstate the tension between each, as relationships were generally good.

SB was initially conceived as a secret organization running a network of spies to protect the state against subversive elements.¹⁰⁶ In this context, intelligence is about foreknowledge and timeliness.¹⁰⁷ Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl apply this traditional meaning to recent conflicts:

Effective, accurate and timely intelligence is essential to the conduct of any form of warfare,' wherein 'nothing is more demoralizing to insurgents than realizing that people inside their movement' are providing information to government authorities.¹⁰⁸

Crucially, Home Office guidelines were unsuited.¹⁰⁹ *Tales of the R.I.C.* shows why. It highlights how a source prevented attacks, disrupted IRA terrorist activity, saved life, was compromised, and then executed by the terrorist organization he was part of.¹¹⁰ None of which is catered for in the national guidelines because they were not based on policing a conflict. Rather, they were based on solving ordinary crime such as theft and burglary in a peaceful setting. The knowledge and empathy approach outlined in *Tales of the R.I.C.* used to recruit a source is evident eight decades later in accounts by self-disclosed PIRA sources—Gilmour, O'Callaghan, Fulton, and McGartland.¹¹¹ Of this issue, "restricted" research that describes "unknown unknowns" as the "X Factor" is informative.¹¹² It employs theories of psychology to show the vulnerability of systems and processes predicated on human relationships, pointing out that handlers (detectives who recruit and run a source) rarely know the full picture. According to former SB officers, this is because a source quite often holds back information, lies about some issues, and embellishes others—factors accentuated by an inbuilt survival mechanism when the risk of exposure is usually death.

Another inherent difficulty that compounds the grayness is the law. Since the Parliamentary Rewards Act (1692) was abandoned in the eighteenth century, statute law has remained silent on this issue.¹¹³ Noting this, the De Silva Report (2012) states: "Nowhere was the need for a proper legal framework for agent-handling thrown into sharper focus than in Northern Ireland."¹¹⁴ In the absence of any legal framework, despite persistent representations to London by the RUC dating back to 1970, SB used the common law principle of protecting life as guidance. Though not ideal, it evidences the intent of its actions was manifestly ethical and lawful. Another profound difficulty was the criminal justice system. It was an ill fit to intelligence-led policing and less sympathetic to that in the rest of the UK and the Republic. Mainly because of this and a legal benchmark of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, more suspects were walking free than was the norm in any irregular war before or since. New terrorist tactics at the start of the conflict (abducting and killing surveillance operators) quickly rendered most SB operational procedures redundant much in the same way extensive civil unrest had overwhelmed the police and forced a period (1969–1976) of Army primacy. Although not the "shambles" Charters describes, it was organizationally unprepared to deal with a modern conflict, which Charters argues is why the Army and MI5 assumed control of intelligence at this juncture.¹¹⁵

In response, by the mid-1980s a sophisticated combination of surveillance (E4A), coordination (Tactical and Coordination Group – TCG), and specialized

armed response (E4 Special Support Unit, later renamed E4 Headquarters Mobile Support Unit) complemented the traditional intelligence gathering function (Divisional SB). Specific to TCG, this included the Det (British Army Special Forces surveillance teams), SAS, and Close Observation Platoon (COP) liaison officers, contradicting claims by Dillon that the Det were not represented on TCG.¹¹⁶ In short, SB (or “E” Department, as it also became known in 1976) evolved into a tripartite arrangement of Collection (offices strategically located and integrated throughout the Force), Surveillance (including coordination and armed response at three regional hubs), and a small central HQ. It guided the entire overt security effort while also harnessing and coordinating all police and Army covert assets. Of the revised covert aspect, the Richards Report, “Co-ordination of the Security Effort in Northern Ireland: The Way Ahead,” by leading MI5 figure Sir Brooks Richards (March 20, 1981), states:

Though it took time to perfect, the RUC’s reaction to this changing situation was to develop, in collaboration with the Army, a sophisticated method of operation based on good intelligence and surveillance leading to the ‘red-handed’ capture of active terrorists.

Richards was aware that covert operations in which key insurgents were apprehended in possession of illegal munitions were having a debilitating effect on the PIRA. Such successes did not rely on confessions or uncorroborated evidence (failed approaches by Crime Squads and Converted Terrorists). Similarly, the tactics employed compensated for a “say nothing” culture within hostile areas (republican and loyalist) that prevented witness testimony and also countered terrorist methodology that routinely ensured no incriminating forensic clues were left at crime scenes. Instead, the timing of the intervention secured the physical evidence necessary to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The downside was that in a courtroom, death because a terrorist group suspected someone of informing as a result of what an SB officer said (however innocuous this appeared to others) was a very real prospect. Even though the way these “red-handed” interventions occurred dramatically unraveled in two trials where E4 SSU SB officers were charged with murder, in acquitting them, both judges recognized the dilemma the officers faced. That is, SB performed a national security role, and every SB officer, unlike the rest of the police force, had signed the Official Secret Act, which worked against full disclosure in open court. The inherent danger being that sensitive methodologies are exposed, secret sources compromised, and potentially a source is killed. Yet the court required full disclosure. Reconciling the two was the difficulty SB officers faced, which both judges recognized. Regardless, events were portrayed as a shoot-to-kill policy pursuant of a Dirty War.¹¹⁷

Whilst covert operations caught public attention, they were typically around 14 percent of overall arrests. Conventional policing practices proved

most productive. In other words, it was the overt aspect of frontline policing that dominated. Daily briefings and interactions (usually oral) by Divisional SB with Uniform Police, CID, and regular Army units produced an excellent level of local knowledge (commonly taken for granted) about suspects, terrorist tactics, and the threat that resulted in routine successes—arresting and prosecuting offenders, recovering munitions, and thwarting attacks.

INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING: ITS EFFECTIVENESS

In 1978 General Glover (founder of the Force Research Unit [FRU]) drafted a classified report titled, “Northern Ireland: Future Terrorist Trends” that fell into the hands of the Provisionals, who published it in the *Republican News*.¹¹⁸ Glover concluded that it was impossible to defeat the PIRA militarily, which became the headline.¹¹⁹ Conversely, SB was confident about defeating the PIRA—defeat defined as PIRA prioritizing the ballot box over the armalite. That is, turning the Provisionals into a political party, similar to how the Official IRA was transformed into the Workers Party.¹²⁰ The Richards Report also disagreed, regarding it as a depressing assessment, whereas the Army believed it was “not winning and could conceivably lose.” Glover’s was an isolated view and out of sync with the mainstream intelligence assessment. In the late 1970s, Belfast PIRA had been irreparably weakened and was no longer capable of delivering victory on its own. The Richards Report shows how this translated on-the-ground:

There are now few parts of the Province where the PIRA can operate with ease. This is reflected in a general movement of the incidence of terrorism towards the border areas and adjacent towns and away from Belfast in particular.

Richards rationalized that, despite security gains in Northern Ireland,

Cross-border terrorism of the traditional type has proved more intractable, as the terrorist structure south of the Border remains largely intact.

Where the weight of expectation in achieving victory rested on Belfast PIRA in the 1970s, this had shifted to cross-border units in the early 1980s. Patterson shows that Dublin’s attitude meant the PIRA had a relatively free run of the Republic’s territory.¹²¹ Cross-border units comprised the majority of brigades and accounted for approximately 73 percent of insurgent killings from 1979 until the first ceasefire in 1994. This contests Dublin’s insistence that the border and the Republic’s territory contributed to 3 percent of insurgent incidents in Northern Ireland.¹²² Also, of 113 extradition requests, only eight were successful.¹²³ A 93 percent failure rate indicates Dublin did little to refute the “soft on terrorism” label it was keen to lose.¹²⁴ Equally, the Richards Report states: “Garda shortcomings are sometimes attributed to a combination of a

lack of willingness to proceed against PIRA.” He links this to “very few convictions in the Republic of terrorists from border areas” and also illustrates how politics unduly intruded. By contrast, an estimate of E4 SSU/HMSU SB successes in covert operations from 1980–1998 shows approximately 1,500 arrests, 1,000 weapons, and 50 tons of explosives recovered.¹²⁵ The religious breakdown broadly matched that of the Early Prisoner Release scheme of the Belfast Agreement, where, as a proportion of the total deaths (60 percent by republicans and 30 percent loyalists), of 448 prisoners released early 43 percent were loyalists and 54 percent republicans.¹²⁶ Clearly, it was an impartial approach. Of one such operation:

On January 8, 1988, Davy Payne, a long-standing UDA veteran with a violent sectarian record, was stopped in a car on the Mahon Road outside Portadown. The police found sixty one rifles, more than 120 rifle magazines, more than 11,000 rounds of ammunition and 50 hand grenades concealed inside the car. A court was later told that there were enough weapons in Payne’s possession to supply a small army.¹²⁷

A former SB officer relates that the incident involved three cars stopped by E4 HMSU and the successful conviction of three prominent loyalists. He also points out that Divisional SB triggered further arrests (including corrupt Security Force personnel) and significant seizures, the net effect of which was to severely restrict the operational capacity of loyalist paramilitaries.¹²⁸ In contrast, the Provisionals still had an enormous arsenal in the Republic. E4 arrests peaked in 1992, almost equaling Divisional arrests. Approximately 40 percent of the insurgent network (estimated by SB at 500 volunteers) was being convicted on a yearly basis with the certainty of this remaining and very probably improving. Around half were On-The-Run (OTR)—fugitives based in the Republic of Ireland. 99.5 percent of all suspects (who were usually armed) in TCG operations involving E4 as the primary responder were arrested, the vast majority receiving lengthy prison sentences. There was an inevitability about being caught that demoralized volunteers. Simply put, the PIRA was running out of frontline operators. Pressure was being exerted from the ground up. The level and constancy of attrition and its impact placed enormous strain on the social fabric of the Provisionals’ small support-base.¹²⁹ This and daily guidance by Divisional SB of local police was behind the expansion of “normal” policing, which was fatal for the Provisionals.

The SAS was another tactical component, albeit very rarely used relative to E4 SSU/HMSU. From 1983 to 1998, it was responsible for killing 41 insurgents,¹³⁰ the majority in cross-border PIRA units, approximately a third of which were OTRs. Unlike Belfast and Derry city, these units routinely used heavy caliber weapons, often along with large improvised explosive devices (IEDs). During ninety days in 1985, sixteen police officers (including three female officers) were killed in border areas.¹³¹ At the same period, 45 police

stations were destroyed or damaged in bomb attacks.¹³² In 1983 Interpol asserted, “Northern Ireland was the most dangerous place in the world to be a policeman. The risk factor was twice as high as El Salvador, the second most dangerous.”¹³³ Tackling these units carried enormous physical risk. Hence the SAS was considered the best tactical option. As with E4 HMSU, the explicit aim was always to arrest. The difficulty for the SAS was that they were routinely up against insurgents who posed the greatest threat to life. Despite this, Geraghty states that they arrested several times the number they killed (nine) from 1976 to 1984. However, Geraghty claiming that the only covert “synthesis” was between the SAS and Intelligence Corps is at odds with a series of SAS operations in border areas from 1987 to 1992, all of which were based on SB intelligence.¹³⁴ When these lethal incidents (SAS/Det) are added to E4’s for roughly the same period, it equates to approximately 4 percent of all suspects confronted in a TCG operation. Considered alongside Divisional arrests, 99.5 percent of all terrorist suspects were arrested as the overall result of a dominant SB. This conforms to Nagl’s categorization of a non-destructive approach.¹³⁵ It was also highly accurate, which meant collateral damage involving innocent civilians was extremely rare.

In examining covert operations, however, Ellison and Smyth conclude that other options were always available and—because they were not taken—that this is evidence of a Dirty War. They claim that killing suspects was seen as “the only option open to a security force apparatus.”¹³⁶ Sharing this view is Ní Aoláin, who represents a popular academic post-conflict perspective, particularly within Northern Ireland, promoted by the Transitional Justice Institute. Ní Aoláin claims there was a “lack of emphasis on arrests.”¹³⁷ Taylor and Urban broadly concur.¹³⁸ What these authors have done is restrict their examination to a selective sample (0.5 to 4 percent) and promoted it as representative of the intelligence attack. Also, Ellison and Smyth are adamant “that over half of the *victims* [author’s emphasis] of undercover operations had no obvious paramilitary connections.”¹³⁹ Yet for the period they scrutinize (1988–1992), the terrorist element is 91 percent, almost twice what they claim.¹⁴⁰ A larger flaw in this type of literature is that it subscribes to a destructive counterinsurgency approach espoused by Newsinger that equates victory to you killing more of the enemy than they do of you.¹⁴¹ This has led them to conclude that (as with Newsinger) the security response was ineffective, which explains why Ní Aoláin promotes SAS killings as the “active counterinsurgency” and dismisses the RUC contribution, describing it as “the anatomy of police failure.”¹⁴²

Conversely, senior PIRA figure Brendan Hughes believes the police-led intelligence effort had “effectively brought the IRA to a standstill where it could move very, very little.”¹⁴³ Another leading PIRA personality, Gerry Bradley, quantifies this, claiming SB prevented 90 percent of attacks. Holland and Phoenix from an SB perspective put the figure at 80 percent.¹⁴⁴ Halfway is

85 percent. The estimate also applies to loyalist paramilitaries. It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude that if approximately 3,500 lives lost are representative of the 15 percent of attacks not prevented, 85 percent equates to around 20,000 lives saved. The same applies to approximately 50,000 injured (15 percent) and approximately 280,000 (85 percent) injuries prevented.¹⁴⁵ Even allowing for a third reduction in estimates, because security was less effective prior to police primacy, inclusive of the small percentage of killings the Security Forces were responsible for, estimates are still significant—approximately 14,000 lives saved and 190,000 injuries prevented. Quantitatively, it gets across the point that, had it not been for effective security, far more casualties would have resulted.

A critical force multiplier in this respect was the Provisionals' paranoia of SB, particularly how it used "informers." PIRA hunger striker Gerard Hodgins in 2014 refers to this in rating the intelligence attack as "colossal and fatal," claiming the Provisionals "armed struggle" was futile in the face of it. He explains that this was because

The British penetrated the Provos at every level and put their agents and spies in place to ruin us from within . . . Add to this the success of the British in pioneering recruitment and handling, where they delivered one of the most resilient guerrilla armies, the IRA [PIRA], to just where they wanted us.

His remarks were made in the context of warning dissident Republicans not to copy the Provisionals' strategy as he sees contemporary accounts of the organization having obscured this important fact.¹⁴⁶ While Hodgins makes valid points, like most, he misses the diversity of the intelligence attack. Information provided by "sources" (also referred to as agents or informers) was around half the intelligence gathered. Technical sources and surveillance largely accounted for the rest.

In February 1993 the Provisionals made representations to the British Prime Minister John Major asking for help to end their "armed struggle."¹⁴⁷ The main demand was to release all their prisoners and an amnesty for OTRs—valuable political leverage for London. Their secondary demand was to disband the RUC (inclusive of SB). Gifted with this position, Barker accuses Blair of caving in to an outrageous "wish list" that the Provisionals could not believe he agreed to.¹⁴⁸ Blair was reaping the benefits of an effective intelligence attack that decimated PIRA without; it would appear, understanding this. Once the Provisionals announced a permanent cessation of hostilities, loyalist paramilitaries followed, validating Thatcher's analysis of the threat and fulfilling the objectives of the Whole of Government strategy. The conflict formally concluded with 1998's Belfast Agreement, focused on intra-communal local government and development and bilateral relations between the British and Irish governments. Security, an imperative of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, was conspicuously absent.

WHAT IS THE NORTHERN IRELAND MODEL?

The Belfast Agreement, which Aughey describes as the “art and effect of political lying” forms the basis of the Northern Ireland model.¹⁴⁹ O’Kane writes that the Irish model has enabled politicians to increase their political profile on the world stage but that exporting the model without a proper overall context is more about inspiring others than providing tangible help. Even though O’Kane is unsure about what the Northern Ireland model contains, it is clear from his writing that it does not contain the security element. Widely accredited with having secured the Belfast Agreement is British Prime Minister Tony Blair. However, neither he, his senior adviser Jonathan Powell, nor his Northern Ireland Secretary of State Mo Mowlam (1997–1999) promote security as a crucial factor in negotiating the Northern Ireland peace.¹⁵⁰ Significantly, the Labour leader became Prime Minister in May 1997 when the conflict was effectively over. Negotiating the peace shaped his perspective.

Northern Ireland Secretary of State Peter Hain (2005–2007) delivered a speech in 2007 titled “Peacemaking in Northern Ireland: A Model for Conflict Resolution?” In it he claims that the Basque region of Spain, South Africa, the Middle East, Kashmir, Colombia, Kosovo, and many more divided societies can learn from Northern Ireland’s experience. He says it should “stand as an inspiration” to others.¹⁵¹ There is no mention of security. Like O’Kane,¹⁵² Hain sees its main attribute as inspirational. Other political accounts follow suit, nationalist leaders—John Hume and various Irish premiers—also focus on politics’, which is in keeping with their view that security was not a priority during the conflict.¹⁵³ Former President Bill Clinton, who helped to broker the Belfast Agreement, is another.¹⁵⁴

Aspirations are not for implementation, however. The proposition advanced here is that the Northern Ireland model, adapted to incorporate security lessons learned, would prove invaluable for conflict regulation, practitioners, and security and policing experts elsewhere. None of this should be misconstrued as undermining the significance of negotiating peace, nor does it suggest that security was solely capable of ending the conflict. (It was not.) Rather, the existing Northern Ireland model tendered is incomplete when the security features of the process are absent.

The existing Northern Irish model not only obscures the security features of the peace but also further undermines security. The political and legal architecture of the Belfast Agreement was designed to appease constitutionalists who harbored reservations about the police. The outworking of this can be seen in reports into the past by newly created statute bodies, such as the Office of the Police Ombudsman (OPONI), that accuse SB of prolonging the conflict.¹⁵⁵ Valid report findings are obscured by a series of controversial conclusions. Retired SB officers have lost confidence in OPONI’s ability to conduct a fair investigation, criticism recently endorsed by a highly respected

senior Catholic police officer (retired) currently Chief Executive of Cooperation Ireland (a peace building charity). Peter Sheridan criticized OPONI for an imbalanced investigation and unfair findings, indicating that in obscuring the security features of the peace process, the post-agreement implementation of peace is equally hindered by failures in security-related oversight.¹⁵⁶ From a practitioner's perspective, the major flaw in this respect is that any departure from normal policing or what was the norm in the rest of the UK is interpreted by retrospective inquiries as negligence.

Post-conflict security became the main target of blame, thus sheltering the feel-good factor of the political endgame from any political fallout in the guise of a standalone model that benefited the international standing of all parties. Examples are Blair's peace envoy role in the Middle East; Powell's envoy-type role in Libya; Sinn Féin in 2013 meeting the Castro brothers and FARC guerilla leaders in Cuba to advise on the Colombian peace initiative¹⁵⁷; and a cross-party Iraq peace mission in 2008 led by Martin McGuinness (former PIRA leader and current Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland).¹⁵⁸

Another post-conflict development that complements the focus on politics with a critical view of security is the liberal concept of transitional justice.¹⁵⁹ Local NGOs traditionally critical of security, such as CAJ (Criminal Administration of Justice), further the concept.¹⁶⁰ This perspective presents a view that warns others against adopting RUC policing practice because it aggravates conflict in divided societies. The post-conflict transitional justice outlook advocates an early perspective of the RUC, where it is viewed as a sectarian force, an instrument of Unionist State domination, "a participant in the conflict rather than a neutral law enforcement agency."¹⁶¹ Encapsulating the political and intellectual confection and its depiction of security is Brendan O'Leary, a widely published academic and political advisor to key Labour figures in the Blair government. He also advised Irish-American delegations on Northern Ireland affairs and is credited with influencing the commission on police reform in 1999.¹⁶² In a 2005 journal article, he cautions against denting the "group honor" or shaming the Provisionals.¹⁶³ O'Leary's thinking is insightful, as it would be self-defeating to embarrass the main protagonists with their past actions when the aim is to lock them into a new political arrangement. In the process, however, the RUC became a political expedient for Labour in its negotiations with insurgent leaders, making it politically inconvenient to then include security in any explanation of the progress toward peace. Therefore, the current Northern Ireland model does not exhibit the "multipronged approach" Richardson lauds as the main lesson learned.¹⁶⁴

POST-CONFLICT: DISPROPORTIONATE FOCUS ON THE STATE

A central target of blame post-conflict has been SB vis-à-vis a Dirty War thesis deeply rooted in PSF propaganda and comprising five ingredients:

(1) sectarian RUC; (2) oppressive policing; (3) shoot-to-kill; (4) counter-gangs; and (5) collusion. Undermining the first three are, as already referred to, actual outcomes regarding the religious breakdown of arrest figures, insurgent/counterinsurgent casualty ratios, and a 96 percent arrest rate in all covert operations.

Of counter-gangs or pseudo-gangs, this originates from the early 1970s when PSF propagandists connected it to British Army Brigadier and irregular warfare author Frank Kitson's presence in Belfast. They selectively quoted his literature in order to undermine the security effort by claiming it mirrored brutal covert practices he describes in earlier conflicts (predominantly Malaya and Kenya).¹⁶⁵ Journalists amplified the correlation as they had very little other information about covert activity to "latch onto."¹⁶⁶ Illustrating how this endures, McKay repeats well-worn counter-gang claims by Dillon, Geraghty, and Ellison and Smyth that accuse the state of "using loyalist paramilitaries to carry out acts."¹⁶⁷ Yet Kitson (who was in charge of 39 brigade in Belfast for 18 months, 1970–1972) testified to the Saville Inquiry in 2001 that his theories from other conflicts were not used in Northern Ireland.¹⁶⁸ Also, the criterion for counter-gangs that both Franklin and Mumford broadly describe does not fit the accusations and is nothing like anything that actually occurred.¹⁶⁹

When looking at collusion, it is important to note that it is often inseparable from the counter-gang accusation from which it originates. The most recent iteration is Cadwallader alleging that Westminster enacted a strategy of murdering Catholics via Kitson-type counter-gangs controlled by SB. Her study enlists 120 cases of Catholics killed in border counties (1972–1978).¹⁷⁰ When examining these, the murder clearance rate is approximately 32 percent. In contrast, Patterson's study shows an 8 percent murder clearance rate for Protestants killed along the border by insurgents (1971–1989).¹⁷¹ Comparing the two, the police were better at prosecuting Protestants who murdered Catholics than Catholics who murdered border Protestants.

Other inconsistencies on this issue arise when considering the testimony of the son of Patrick Finucane (Michael Finucane) to the US Congress in 2013, where he claims, "the more troublesome the individual, the more likely the State was to deploy its killers-by-proxy [Kitson counter-gangs] to erase the problem."¹⁷² He accused the British of colluding with loyalists in murdering its most obstructive opponents, which he believes is how the state viewed his late father, who was a prominent lawyer from the minority community murdered by the UDA/UFF in 1989. One is confident the Provisionals' leadership qualified as "obstructive opponents." Yet Cadwallader claims, "almost the entire IRA leadership escaped the conflict very much alive."¹⁷³ As Urban notes, "This is not what one would have expected if intelligence agencies frustrated by their inability to put senior IRA members behind bars, were behind the killings."¹⁷⁴ Further, English points out that "the idea of close cooperation between loyalists and the state . . . sits uneasily with the very large number of loyalists

imprisoned by that state during the Troubles.”¹⁷⁵ Moreover, the accusations are incompatible with the organizational character of SB and Whole of Government strategy.

Headlining the collusion allegation is the murder of Patrick Finucane that embroiled SB, the FRU, and MI5 as having conspired with sources within the UDA/UFF in killing the Catholic lawyer.¹⁷⁶ Investigating it was the Deputy Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire, John Stevens. Selected because of his strong CID background, he formed an immediate bond with the RUC’s CID.¹⁷⁷ Stevens accused SB of sectarian bias and correlated this to it being ineffective at countering loyalist violence that, in turn, compelled De Silva in his 2012 review of the Finucane murder to expose these accusations as flawed.¹⁷⁸ Stevens also treated Northern Ireland as a conflict-free environment. In doing so, he then rebuked the concept of a dominant SB, which he considered was to the detriment of CID, and held back “normal” policing.¹⁷⁹ This interpretative lens became the norm for retrospective investigations. Submitting in excess of one million pages to the director of public prosecutions (DPP), Stevens concluded that SB could have prevented Patrick Finucane’s murder and done more to help CID prosecute those responsible.

In response, the DPP in 2007 issued a public statement that highlighted collusion is not a criminal offense in concluding, “the test for prosecution was not met.”¹⁸⁰ The DPP judgment outraged the family of Patrick Finucane, Amnesty International, and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.¹⁸¹ What Stevens had done was construct a definition that ranged from poor record-keeping and acts of omission to sources involved in murder.¹⁸² Worth reiterating is that the standard of record keeping Stevens set is based on his expectations of what it should entail, anything below which being labeled collusion. It takes no account of the very limited resources available, the hectic pace of conflict, and that perfecting records to the level demanded would have degraded operational effectiveness by relocating frontline officers into back offices. Canadian judge Peter Cory broadened the definition in 2004, and despite the DPP later showing that collusion is totally meaningless in a criminal justice context, OPONI adopted Cory’s version.¹⁸³ The net effect is the public has come to understand it as “the widespread practice of using ‘counter-gangs’ to eliminate or terrorise those who oppose the policies and actions of the powerful.”¹⁸⁴ Alert to this, an assistant chief constable in 2010 asked OPONI if they could specify what crime or misconduct they suspect SB officers of as opposed to using “collusion” as a catchall term as it tends to be sensationalized by the media and misrepresents events.¹⁸⁵ His viewpoint outraged local NGOs and was rebuked by OPONI.¹⁸⁶

It is in the legal vagueness of managing “penetrative” sources, however, that collusion prospers most. In the early 1970s, Eveleigh was aware of ambiguous law lending itself to being interpreted differently at a later date.¹⁸⁷ This left SB officers vulnerable to later allegations. Even then, as De Silva essentially

alludes to, Patrick Finucane's murder is better explained as a systems failure and the potential criminality of individuals rather than a sinister and sectarian intelligence effort or the outworking of official policy. Essentially, Stevens, Cory¹⁸⁸ and OPONI in setting a modern, peaceful, and normally functioning society as the context have produced findings that, in broad terms, collide with universally recognized irregular war precepts. Primarily, that sources active within an insurgent network is the most effective means of protecting life and reducing violence in a conflict. A 2007 UN report confirms that this still remains the case.¹⁸⁹ In sum, a context contrived after the fact contradicts the ground-truth reality at the time.

Prior to Stevens, the UDA/UFF was suitably contained.¹⁹⁰ Afterwards, however, sources were compromised. This facilitated a new generation of militants to emerge, described by one as, "John Stevens did us a favour. He got rid of the touts."¹⁹¹ Also, loyalist murders more than doubled in the next five years when compared to the previous five and continued to increase thereafter.¹⁹² Further, loyalists had murdered one person for informing in the eight years prior to Stevens compared to five in the same period afterwards.¹⁹³ This is why Wood correlates Stevens with having increased killings by loyalist paramilitaries.¹⁹⁴ Popular accounts, however, do not make this connection.¹⁹⁵

Another flaw of retrospective investigations is that they have suffered from the cognitive impairment of "hindsight bias."¹⁹⁶ It is a condition where when we look back on something we are prejudiced in believing we would have predicted that it was going to happen and ultimately prevented it. The condition is most pronounced in the intelligence arena and is further aggravated by the West's "fantasies of total control."¹⁹⁷ The most extraordinary fault, however, is that despite not framing the proper context, retrospective findings produce tactical options to show what should have been done in order to support a finding that the incident was preventable. This is not solely down to hindsight bias but also to investigators having limited experience of policing a conflict.¹⁹⁸

In short, when the Dirty War thesis is forensically examined it is left wanting. This is not to suggest that the bulk of the security effort—the police and its Special Branch—was optimal. But, when compared to the record of its counterpart in the Republic against the PIRA SB successes against loyalist paramilitaries fared better.

A consequence of the Belfast Agreement is a disproportionate examination of policing and security has occurred, best measured in a financial context. One investigation into a single murder¹⁹⁹ where collusion was alleged cost £46.1 million, equaling the cost of investigating 19,000 victims of apartheid in South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.²⁰⁰ The post-conflict legal environment has provided excellent economic opportunities for law firms, benefiting some protagonists at the expense of others. In this regard the main protagonists had a major head start.²⁰¹ Also, Dirty War stories remain highly popular with the media.²⁰²

At its core, the Dirty War thesis is a combination of ideological and political intolerance. Nationalist leaders such as Gerry Fitt and Paddy Devlin were stigmatized as collaborating with the British for challenging it.²⁰³ The other side of the same argument (which the SDLP do not subscribe to but have difficulty in distancing themselves from) is promoting the main protagonists as peace-makers.²⁰⁴ In turn, this portrays the police and British Army as the terrorists. Of this, a former RUCSB officer states:

The service I provided goes right across the board irrespective of race, colour, religion or creed. I think what makes me angry is the way that my job was tainted, to make me look like the bad guy . . . It didn't matter where the call came from, you dealt with it not knowing who the call was for or what your job was about, its the basic principle of preservation of life . . .²⁰⁵

He and two young US Marines were shot dead by the Taliban not long after the interview. His actions saved at least 18 lives and resulted in the United States recommending him for a Silver Star. The British awarded him a Queen's Gallantry Medal. Preservation of life remains the priority of police officers.

CONCLUSIONS

Security policy is conspicuously absent from the Northern Ireland peace process model. This is mostly because the Whole of Government strategy was framed in such a way as to provide the main protagonist a face-saving way of withdrawing from armed violence, by allowing its political wing to declare victory. Unambiguous headline objectives of unifying Ireland and forcing a British withdrawal by force of arms were replaced by social justice grievances, distracting from any notion of military defeat or, indeed, the utter futility of engaging in a failed terrorist campaign. This proved politically convenient for all sides. The imperative was to consolidate a fragile peace. For this reason, the contribution made by security policies was suppressed.

Academics, including Dixon, demonstrate a popular perspective that excludes security as integral to peace, arguing instead that a fresh and purely political approach initiated under the auspices of the Blair Labour government in 1997 ended the conflict.²⁰⁶ This perspective fails to examine both the scope of the threat and the character of the security response and how both evolved. As a result, it fails to identify a longstanding Whole of Government strategy that included security and politics designed for the purpose of achieving a devolved and inclusive political settlement.

In contrast, Bew and Frampton represent an academic viewpoint that raises "push and pull" or Whole of Government strategy in developing their argument in *Talking to Terrorists*.²⁰⁷ Similarly, Clancy views the Northern Ireland model as incomplete because it excludes security²⁰⁸:

Understanding this aspect of the Northern Ireland ‘model’ is probably the only way of producing relevant ‘lessons’ for areas such as Iraq. Unfortunately, this aspect of Northern Ireland’s war is perhaps least understood: coming to grips with it will undoubtedly take years of painstaking research that, at best, will only provide partial insights. Moreover, the potential for such research to present scholars with morally uncomfortable and perhaps counterintuitive ‘lessons’ as to how to create peace is also likely to keep scholars from probing too deeply into this most murky area. That said, it would be sad if as M.L.R. Smith (1999) suggests, one of the most over researched areas in the world ended up being one of the least understood.²⁰⁹

Acknowledging an effective security effort as instrumental in ending the conflict; many require more detail before fully endorsing it. Bew’s most recent work, however, is less reticent, positioning SB at the center of “a patient but firm security policy” crucial to “bringing the conflict to an end.”²¹⁰ Politically, the 2013 Haass proposals (by US diplomat Richard Haass) aimed at reviving an ailing peace settlement show why this outlook is the minority view. Haass, in broad terms, falls in behind Dixon’s argument, thereby illustrating how the activities, strategy, and policies of the main protagonists are being and have been subtly sanitized by proxy post-conflict. The further we have moved from the conflict, the greater this has become. It is a refined way of retrospectively portraying the main protagonists as peacemakers. It has not, however, been a fault-free divorce. Any official reference to security since 1998 has been to retrospectively investigate it, which has equated to undermining it.

This article does not contend that the political endgame and happenings in the post-conflict era are of no benefit. Nor does it seek to downplay the significant contribution of reformed insurgents in the peace process. Rather, it contends that interpretations of the Belfast Agreement conceal as much as they reveal. It also contends that security was crucial to bringing about peace, which was contingent on defeating the main aggressor—PIRA. The profound difficulty, however, is that security is conspicuously absent from the popularly promoted explanation of how peace was achieved in a Northern Ireland model based on the subterfuge of the Belfast Agreement.²¹¹

This violates the “parity of esteem” principle enshrined in that agreement. Moreover, post-conflict reflections suffer from taxonomy after-the-fact applications rather than an anthological application of policing mechanisms employed at the time. Success is British policy and politics. Failure is indigenous policing and security. To think PIRA did not need countered by a security response is foolhardy. Yet this is what the Northern Ireland model conveys. It contains no deterrent. Therefore, it lends itself to being interpreted as meaning that the Provisionals long war was successful and worth copying. This appeals to groups such as Boko Haram and IS [Islamic State] who are at the beginning of violent campaigns and looking for inspiration from what worked elsewhere.

As currently constituted, the Northern Ireland model precludes against any examination of the threat, Petraeus urging us to first understand the threat before we can understand the response.²¹² Generally forgotten is that it was the worst conflict of its time, played out under intense media scrutiny. The RUC moved much faster than people realize. It outstripped the British Army, an expeditionary force renowned for its capacity to quickly adapt. Its trajectory changed as the conflict progressed. SB success was due to unsung actors who were dynamic and innovative. Security, however, effectively disappeared from 1994–1998, only reappearing to be retrospectively criticized. The net effect has been to undermine the Northern Ireland model's capacity to make peace happen elsewhere. For this to take place in countries such as Iraq, the reality of what happened in Northern Ireland needs to be confronted.

The Provisionals were right. It was a war, albeit irregular and unconventional. London, however, had to maintain the pretense that it was not and the conventional could cope with the unconventional. This was and is a façade. But it typifies modern conflict. It is contradictory, complex, and confused. Because the conflict merits “war” status explains the retribution and reparation character of the post-conflict era that has hindered meaningful reconciliation.

Terrorist attacks in Iraq peaked at 225 per day (one every 7 minutes), six times greater than the Northern Ireland peak of 36 (one every 40 minutes).²¹³ Conflicts of this type are becoming increasingly violent, common, and intractable. No two are the same. What works in one place may not work in another, but no definitive decision can be made about what did work without a comprehensive understanding of the threat and the policies—political and security—employed to counter it. Notwithstanding the flaws in the security approach and criticism of it, one cannot subsequently ignore the security role in the Northern Ireland model.

NOTES

1. Merlynn Rees, *Northern Ireland: A Personal Perspective* (London: Methuen, 1985), 334.
2. Interview with former SB officer, author's PhD research, UK 2011.
3. Tim Pat Coogan, *The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal, 1966–96, and the search for peace* (London: Hutchinson, 1995). Also see Michael Carver, *Out of Step: The Memoirs of Field Marshal Lord Carver* (London: Hutchinson, 1989), 409.
4. Rees, *Northern Ireland*, 308–309.
5. Rees, *Northern Ireland*, 11 and 310. Also see Carver, *Out of Step*, 410–11, who was equally perplexed at how “harsh interrogation” techniques were introduced, blaming Whitehall and the Director General of Intelligence in the MOD who was not under his command.
6. Brian Faulkner, *Memoirs of a Statesman* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1978), 124–125, also see Peter Taylor, *Beating the Terrorists? Interrogation in Omagh, Gough and Castlereagh* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1980), 20.

7. Robin Eveleigh, *Peacekeeping in a Democratic Society* (London: C. Hurst & Company Publishers, 1978), 2 and 134.
8. John D. Brewer and Kathleen Magee, *Inside the RUC* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 2–4.
9. Chris Ryder, *The Fateful Split: Catholics and the Royal Ulster Constabulary* (London: Methuen, 2004), 33.
10. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, *The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 372. Chris Ryder, *The RUC: A Force Under Fire* (London: Mandarin House, 1990), supports this view, noting the unionist government failed to recruit from the Catholic community. He shows that as the number of Catholic RIC officers dwindled due to natural wastage, the Catholic representation high of 21 percent steadily reduced to 17 percent.
11. “Inquiry will not hear from police chief,” *BBC News*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/1853552.stm (accessed 21 April 2012). Detective Chief Superintendent Frank Lagan’s statement of evidence is exhibit JL1 in the “Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry” by the Rt Hon Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman), 2010.
12. According to a Special Branch officer who served in Derry City at the time of Bloody Sunday. Interview with former SB officer, author’s research, Iraq 2009.
13. Chehab, *Inside the Resistance*, 17, claims that fifteen Iraqi deaths in Fallujah were caused by the 82nd Airborne Division shooting into a demonstration protesting at a teacher’s killing on the previous day.
14. Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq* (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), 28, claims that two US soldiers were killed and nine wounded.
15. Zaki Chehab, *Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East* (NY: Nation Books, 2005), 22.
16. While the US-led Coalition Forces had all the kinetic aspects (modern parlance for the use of conventional military force) of the invasion worked out; there were acute problems with Phase IV—what happens once the conventional war was won? In other words, the counterinsurgency approach. A former US Army officer (interviewed in Afghanistan 2010 as part of author’s research) recounts: “In the run up to the invasion we practiced everything except Phase IV, this was left undone and we all knew it. We knew it would come back to bite us in the ass.” Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir* (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 496–597, describes Phase IV as post-hostilities, stabilization, and reconstruction. Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency*, (Washington DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 3, is critical on the Phase IV issue. He claims Rumsfeld’s office “put intense pressure on the US military to plan for the lowest possible level of US deployment” and underestimated the scale of Iraq’s ethnic/sectarian divisions and economic problems. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*, 29–30, outlines, “top Bush administration officials acknowledged in late summer 2003 that their plans for postwar Iraq had been flawed on the security front.” While the United States had engaged previously in counterinsurgency operations fighting “shrewder and better organised irregular enemies [refers to Vietnam] than the Iraqi insurgents. The Bush administration was simply not expecting a wily and determined enemy in Iraq,” Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 496–536, counters Hashim’s allegations when claiming he was acutely aware of the religious, tribal and general ethnic tensions of the region that would need accommodated in Phase IV. Rumsfeld’s claims are somewhat undermined, however, when reading Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 413, where he relates the senior US commander, General Tommy Franks, had predicted the “decisive combat operations would go very fast and they needed to focus on the aftermath. But Rumsfeld and others had been focused on the war” Indeed, Franks—Tommy Franks,

American Soldier (NY: HarperCollins, 2005), 861—recognized chaos would follow the conventional stage and that Phase IV would take around 5 years. Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 413, accepts that some blame Franks for “blowing the stability operations,” as Franks had all the experience and troops to succeed. From Franks’ position, Woodward points out the general was unable to convince politicians about postwar plans, feeling they only paid lip service to his appeals. For further reading see, Ali A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), Paul L. Bremer III, *My Year in Iraq* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 2006), Patrick Cockburn, *The Occupation: War and Resistance in Iraq* (London: Verso, 2007), Bruce Hoffman, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004) and Jean-Charles Brisard and Damien Martinez, *Zarqawi: The New Face of al-Qaeda* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005).

17. House of Commons Defence Committee, *Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part One. Seventh Report of Session 2013–14: Volume 1* (London: The Stationary Office Limited, 2014), 30.

18. David E. Spence, “Post-Cold War Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America” in Rich and Duyvesteyn eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 246. Spence shows that the Police in Rio killed 1,200 in 2008. Rio de Janeiro’s population of 5 million is just over three times that of Northern Ireland’s 1.6 million.

19. The percentage is derived from census data that show the Catholic population in Northern Ireland in 1961 was 35.3 percent and in 2001 at 43.76 percent. Statistics from the 2001 Northern Ireland census show a 5 percent decline in the number of Protestants, from 58 percent to 53 percent and a 2 percent increase in the Catholic population from 42 percent to 44 percent. The Catholic community in 2001 makes up the majority of Belfast’s population. Since 1961, when the Protestant figure was 63 percent, it has fallen in every census while the Catholic population has increased from 35 percent. See http://www.4ni.co.uk/northern_ireland_news.asp?id=6135 (accessed 31 Dec 2012). The 2011 census shows Protestants are 45 percent (a decline of 5 percent from 2001) and Catholics are 45 percent of the population (an increase of 1 percent from 2001), see Mark Davenport, “Census figures: NI Protestant population continuing to decline,” *BBC News Northern Ireland* (11 Dec 2012), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-20673534> (accessed 16 Feb 2013). Also see the CAIN website for a summary of each census, found at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/popul.htm> (accessed 16 Feb 2013).

20. Sudarsan Raghavan, “War in Iraq propelling massive migration: Wave creates tension across the Middle East,” *Washington Post Foreign Service*, (4 Feb 2007). Raghavan estimates that 2 million Iraqis left the country, 8 percent of the prewar population. Also see <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/03/AR2007020301604.html> (accessed 22 Feb 2011) and UNDP, *Arab Human Development Report: Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries* (New York: UN Publications 2009), 94, where refugee figures in 2007 for Iraq show: Syria – 1.5 million; Jordan – 0.5 million; Iran – 57,414; and Lebanon – 50,000. Total refugees equal 2,107,414.

21. Gerry Adams, *Hope and History: Making Peace in Ireland* (Ireland: Brandon, 2004), 279.

22. Anne Cadwallader, *Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland* (Cork: Mercier Press, 2013), 341; and Graham Ellison and Jim Smyth, *The Crowned Harp: Policing a Divided Society* (London: Oxford University Press, 1991), 33 and 158.

23. Eamon Mallie and David McKittrick, *The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story Behind the Peace Process* (London: Heinemann, 1996), 1554.

24. Deborah White, "Iraq war Facts, results & Statistics" (January 31, 2012) shows that 4,487 US soldiers were killed, 32,223 seriously wounded, and 316 non-US troops were killed, 179 of which were British. She also estimates that roughly 55,000 Iraqi insurgents were killed and insurgent strength gradually increased from 15,000 in November 2003 to 70,000 in June 2007. Retrieved from <http://usliberals.about.com/od/homelandsecurity/a/IraqNumbers.htm> (accessed 7 Jan 2013). One must be aware that estimates of civilian casualties and responsibility for deaths can widely vary.
25. McKittrick et al., *Lost Lives*, 1553.
26. Toby Harnden, *Bandit Country: The IRA & South Armagh* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1999), 221.
27. Richard J. Chasdi, *Counterterrorism Offensives for the Ghost War World* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010).
28. Bill Clinton, *My Life* (London: Arrow Books, 2005).
29. George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (US: Virgin Books, 2010). Also see Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir* (New York: Sentinel, 2011).
30. Margaret Thatcher, *Margaret Thatcher: The Downing Street Years* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), John Major, *John Major: An Autobiography* (London: HarperCollins, 1999), William Whitelaw, *The Whitelaw Memoirs* (London: Arum Press, 1989), Merlyn Rees, *Northern Ireland: A Personal Perspective* (London: Methuen, 1985) and Roy Mason, *Paying the Price* (London: Robert Hale, 1999).
31. See Fitzgerald, *All in a Life*.
32. Dean Godson, *Himself Alone: David Trimble and the Ordeal of Unionism* (London: HarperCollins, 2004).
33. Interview with General Petraeus. Kabul 2010.
34. Ibid.
35. Faulkner, *Memoirs of a Statesman*, 115.
36. M. L. R. Smyth, *Fighting for Ireland: The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement* (London: Routledge, 1996), Brendan O'Brien, *The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein* (Dublin: O'Brien Press, 1999), Ed Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA* (New York: W. W. Norton., 2002) and Rogelio Alonso, *The IRA and Armed Struggle* (London: Routledge, 2007).
37. David H., Petraeus, James F. Amos and John A. Nagl, *The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 10.
38. David Kilcullen, *Counter Insurgency* (London: Hurst and Company, 2010), 187–188.
39. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (London: Praegar Security International, 2006). 1; and Kilcullen, *Counter Insurgency*, 206. Also see Seán MacStiofáin, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary* (Edinburgh: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975), 133, where he identifies December 1969 as the date when the Provisionals were created.
40. Steven Metz, "Rethinking Insurgency" in Rich and Duyvesteyn, eds. *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 38.
41. Ibid.
42. Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling Shot and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2006), 208.
43. MacStiofáin, *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*, 143–146. MacStiofáin's template was a three-phase strategy to defend Catholics in the north then, "as soon as it became feasible

and practical, the IRA [PIRA] would move from a purely defensive position into a phase of combined defence and retaliation,” followed by “launching all-out offensive action against the British occupation system.” Also see Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. (US: Praeger, 2007).

44. Metz, “Rethinking Insurgency,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, in Rich and Duyvesteyn, eds., 38.

45. Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 150.

46. O’Brien, *The Long War*, 107.

47. Ibid

48. Peter Hart, *The I.R.A. and its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916–1923* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).

49. Petraeus, Nagl and Amos, *The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 385, Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 2, and Charles Townsend, “The Culture of Paramilitarism in Ireland,” chapter 8 in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 315.

50. Eveleigh, *Peace-Keeping in a Democratic Society*, 40, extends this view in pointing out that the Provisionals were unconcerned about the loss of life of a Catholic in an attack by loyalists but welcomed it as an opportunity to project a propaganda message that the “Army had connived” in the shooting because it was a Catholic victim

51. See A. R. Oppenheimer, *IRA the Bombs and the Bullets: A History of Deadly Ingenuity* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2009).

52. Ryder, *The RUC*, 26.

53. Author’s PhD research. The document was captured on a leading PIRA figure in February 1974.

54. Figures obtained from an analysis of David McKittrick, David, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney, Chris Thornton, and David McVea, *Lost Lives: The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles* (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2008).

55. Christina Lamb, “Mullahs stopped Bin Laden killing children,” *Sunday Times* (3 June 2012), 23. Lamb identifies that close associate of bin Laden, Fadil Harun, sat on an al-Qaeda committee that directed, “captured soldiers were not to be killed as they were no longer a threat.”

56. Francis Costello, *The Irish Revolution and its Aftermath 1916–1923: Years of Revolt* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2003). Also see Chris Ryder, *The RUC: A Force Under Fire* (London: Mandarin House, 1990), 211–213.

57. Author’s PhD research.

58. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 40. Also see Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (US: Praeger, 2007), 43–44; where he outlines guerilla warfare cannot exist without the support of the masses.

59. Interview with Tim Collins, Kabul 2010.

60. Kevin Toolis, *Rebel Hearts: Journey’s within the IRA’s Soul* (New York: Macmillan, 1995), 20.

61. Ed Moloney, *Voices From the Grave* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 273–274.

62. See Conor Cruise O’Brien, *Ancestral Voices: Religion and Nationalism in Ireland* (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1995) and also Robert Kee, *The Green Flag: A History of Irish Nationalism* (London: Penguin Books, 2001).

63. Robin Eveleigh, *Peacekeeping in a Democratic Society* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1978), 7.
64. Brid Rodgers was interviewed by Mark Carruthers on 'The View', *BBC 1* (9 April 2013).
65. Europol, *TE-SAT 2013: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* (The Hague: Europol Publications), 26–27, categorizes 'IRA' terrorism as ethno-nationalist. ETA in Spain is similarly categorized.
66. Charles Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century* (London: Faber and Faber 1986), 67.
67. D. J. Betz, "Cyberspace and Insurgency" in Rich and Duyvesteyn, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, 56–58.
68. Interview with General Petraeus, author's PhD research, Kabul 2010.
69. Ryder, *The RUC*, 147.
70. John Hermon, *Holding the Line* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1997), 99.
71. Ibid, 99–111. Hermon explains that Merlyn Rees argued that the Army should not be in control of security and advocated Police primacy. He further illustrates Police primacy was central to a speech by Rees in parliament in January 1976. Rees, *Northern Ireland*, 91, identifies the policy of Police primacy was first thought of by him in 1974. However, it was not until 1 January 1977, according to Chris Ryder, *The Fateful Split: Catholics and the Royal Ulster Constabulary* (London: Methuen, 2004), 249, that a new era was ushered in by Newman. Ryder describes it as, "police primacy with the RUC in the driving seat."
72. General Petraeus supplied the author (December 2010) with papers detailing in broad terms the Whole of Government strategy the US newly drafted for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
73. Richard Iron, "Britain's Longest War: Northern Ireland 1967–2007" in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian eds., *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 177–178, provides an excellent account of Framework Operations conducted by regular Police and Army that were designed to deter and prevent insurgent activity.
74. Thatcher, *Margaret Thatcher*, 384.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Charles Moore, *Margaret Thatcher, The Authorized Biography. Volume One: Not For Turning* (London: Penguin Books, 2013).
78. Henry Patterson, *Ireland's Violent Frontier: The Border and Anglo-Irish Relations during the Troubles* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 189.
79. Author's PhD research broke down the evolution of Special Branch during the conflict into three stages: Reactive (1969–1976); Developmental (1977–1982); and Mature (1983–1998).
80. Lord Gardiner (Chairman), *Report of a Committee to consider in the context of civil liberties and human rights, measures to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland* (London: HMSO, 1975).
81. H. G. Bennett (Chairman, Hon Judge, Q.C.), *Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland* (London: HMSO, 1979). These

reports and others relating to the conflict can be found at the excellent CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet) website located at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk>

82. For the Converted Terrorist concept, see Tony Gifford, *Supergrasses: The Use of Accomplice Evidence in Northern Ireland—A Report by Tony Gifford QC* (London: Cobden Trust, 1984).

83. Interview with a retired SB officer, author's PhD research, Iraq 2009.

84. Thomas Hennessey, *The Evolution of the Troubles 1970–72*. (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007), 345.

85. Patrick Bishop and Eamon Mallie, *The Provisional IRA* (London: Heinemann, 1987), 15. The authors interviewed McGuinness. Also see Peter Taylor, *Brits: The War Against the IRA* (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), 172.

86. Rees, *Northern Ireland*, 149.

87. David Fairhall, "Sir Frank Cooper," *The Guardian* (31 Jan 2002). <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2002/jan/31/guardianobituaries.falklands> (accessed 16 March 2013).

88. Aaron Edwards and Cillian McGrattan, *The Northern Ireland Conflict: A Beginners Guide* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2010), 25–27.

89. Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 142.

90. Interview with former SB officer, author's PhD research, UK 2012.

91. Eamon O'Kane, "Learning from Northern Ireland? The Uses and Abuses of the 'Irish Model,'" *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 12 (2010): 239–256.

92. Patterson, *Ireland's Violent Frontier*, 11–14.

93. Baron Hunt (Chairman), *Report of the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland* (Belfast: HMSO, 1969). A connected report is, Lord Cameron, *Disturbances in Northern Ireland: Report of the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland* (Belfast: HMSO, 1969).

94. Georgina Sinclair, "Sir Arthur Young: The Quintessential English Policeman (Part II – Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary October 1969–November 1970)" *Constabulary Gazette, Historical Society Supplement* (Spring 2000): 5–8 and 6. For further reading on Sir Arthur Young see, Georgina Sinclair, *At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945–1980* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).

95. Peter Taylor, *Stalker: The Search for the Truth* (London: Faber and Faber, 1987). Taylor's account disclosed secret tactics about covert operations and speculated on the identity of sources.

96. Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 390.

97. Charles Townshend, *The British Campaign in Ireland 1919–1921: The Development of Political and Military Policies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 41.

98. Ronald Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 213.

99. Ori Brafman and Rod D. Beckstrom, *The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations* (New York: Portfolio Group, 2006), 39.

100. Interview with former SB officer, author's PhD research, UK 2012.

101. Urban, *Big Boys' Rules*, 47 and Ellison and Smyth, *The Crowned Harp*, 93.
102. Author's PhD research, report by ACC M Slevin (Head of Special Branch), to the NIO, 2 Oct 1979 (Ref: POLF8/SL) regarding the establishment of 'E' Department (SB).
103. At a conference in Belfast (1 July 2014) hosted by the Criminal Administration of Justice (CAJ) and the Transitional Justice Institute of the University of Ulster, Paul O'Connor (Director of the Pat Finucane Centre) delivered a presentation entitled 'Deadly Intelligence and the Rule of Law.' During his delivery O'Connor claimed Special Branch was under the direct control of MI5, which was undisputed by the panel or audience. Regarding the role of MI5 see, Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5* (London: Allen Lane, 2009). There is nothing in Andrew's work that states or implies MI5 directly controlled SB.
104. Stalker, *John Stalker*.
105. Andrew Sanders, "Northern Ireland: The Intelligence War 1969–75," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations (BJPIR)* 13 (2011), 230–248; and Jon Moran, "Evaluating Special Branch and the Use of Informant Intelligence in Northern Ireland," *Intelligence and National Security* 25, no. 1 (February 2010), 1–23.
106. Bernard Porter, *The Origins of the Vigilant State: The London Metropolitan Police Special Branch before the First World War* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987).
107. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Chichester: Capstone, 2010).
108. Petraeus, Amos, and Nagl, *The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 34 and 79.
109. Home Office Circular 97/69, "Guidance on Participating Informers" (1969). Author's PhD research.
110. Anon, *Tales of the R.I.C.*, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1921).
111. Raymond Gilmour, *Dead Ground: Infiltrating the IRA* (London: Warner Books, 1998), Sean O'Callaghan, *The Informer* (London: Corgi Books, 1999), Kevin Fulton, *Unsung Hero: How I Saved Dozens of Lives as a Secret Agent Inside the IRA* (London: John Blake, 2008) and Martin McGartland, *Fifty Dead Men Walking: The Heroic True Story of a British Agent Inside the IRA* (London: John Blake, 2009).
112. Chris Reid and John Buckley, *Human Source Management: A Better Approach to Managing Sources* (UK: Home Office Research, 2005).
113. Dennis G Fitzgerald, *Informants and Undercover Investigations: A Practical Guide to Law and Policy* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2007).
114. Desmond De Silva, *The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review: The Rt Hon Sir Desmond de Silva QC* (London: Stationary Office, 2012), 6.
115. David A. Charters, David A. "Have A Go: British Army/MI5 Agent-running Operations in Northern Ireland 1970–72," *Intelligence and National Security* 28, no. 2 (31 October 2012), 202–229.
116. Martin Dillon, *The Dirty War* (London: Arrow Books, 1991), 468–469.
117. Although the Stalker/Sampson Report has never been published, in 2013 it was given to Martin McCauley (resident in the ROI as he is wanted in Colombia having escaped from serving a custodial sentence related to training FARC terrorists in 2004) the family of Michael Tighe and associate solicitors with the proviso it cannot be disclosed. See Alan Erwin, "Shoot-to-kill reports key to Colombia Three man's appeal," *The Belfast Telegraph.co.uk* (26 April 2013). <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/shoottokill-reports-key-in-colombia-three-mans-appeal-29224575.html> (accessed 4 May 2013).

118. Peter Taylor, *Provos The IRA and Sinn Fein* (London: Bloomsbury, 1998), 214–215. Also see Sean Cronin, *Irish Nationalism: A History of Its Roots and Ideology* (Dublin: The Academy Press, 1980) where Glover's report is reprinted, 339–357.
119. David Ramsbotham, "General Sir James Glover: Soldier whose assessment of the IRA changed the course of war and peace in Ireland," *Guardian, Obituaries* (16 June 2000). <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2000/jun/16/guardianobituaries1> (accessed 2 Sept 2012) shows that Glover's assessment was considered ahead of its time. Also see Richardson "Britain and the IRA" in Art and Richardson eds., *Democracy and Counterterrorism Lesson from the Past*, 78 and Tim Pat Coogan, *The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal, 1966–96, and the search for peace* (London: Hutchinson, 1995), 248–250.
120. See Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, *The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Workers' Party* (London: Penguin Books, 2010).
121. Patterson, *Ireland's Violent Frontier*.
122. Fitzgerald, *All in a Life*, 279 and 572–575.
123. Stephen Dempster, "What about Dublin?" *BBC Spotlight*, BBC1 (7 Feb 2012). The figures relate to the period 1973–1998. The program can be found online at, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006v04h/episodes/guide?page=2> (accessed 18 Feb 2014).
124. Mallie and McKittrick, *The Fight for Peace*, 64.
125. Figures from author's PhD research.
126. 242 prisoners were republican and 194 loyalist, 12 prisoners had no particular affiliation. <http://www.dojni.gov.uk/northern-ireland-prison-service.htm> (accessed 12 May 2010).
127. Jim Cusack and Henry McDonald, *UVF: The Endgame* (Dublin: Poolbeg, 2008), 221.
128. Interview in Afghanistan 2010.
129. Not all those convicted and imprisoned on terrorist-related criminal offences would have been active "volunteers," particularly in Divisional arrests (local Uniform Police), but active supporters caught up in assisting the commission of a terrorist crime—supplying vehicles, providing information on Security Forces, hiding munitions etc.
130. Includes the Det who killed 3. Also, three innocent civilians were killed (two Protestants and one Catholic) as well as three Special Forces soldiers in 22 separate incidents. One loyalist paramilitary was also killed. McKittrick et al., *Lost Lives*, 1551, attributes the SAS with killing 62 people throughout the "Troubles," however, it appears to include anything of a military covert nature under the SAS label and does not itemize how many where insurgents, innocent civilians, loyalist paramilitaries or Security Forces.
131. Sam Trotter, *Constabulary Heroes 1869–2009: Incorporating the RUC GC/PSNI and their Forebears including the USC* (Coleraine: Impact Printing, 2009), 338–353.
132. Tony Geraghty, *The Irish War: The Military History of Domestic Conflict* (London: HarperCollins, 2000), 124.
133. Ryder, *The RUC*, 2.
134. Geraghty, *The Irish War*.
135. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*.
136. Ellison and Smyth, *The Crowned Harp*, 133.

137. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, *The Politics of Force: Conflict Management and State Violence in Northern Ireland* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2000), 234.
138. Urban, *Big Boys' Rules*, Taylor, *Stalker*, and Peter Taylor, *Brits: The War Against the IRA*. (London: Bloomsbury, 2002).
139. Ellison and Smyth, *The Crowned Harp*, 141–142, claim the Security Forces killed 27 during this period [Jan 1988–Dec 1992], 16 in “undercover” operations. However, McKittrick et al, *Lost Lives*, 1553, show the Security Forces were responsible for 39 deaths in this period (Army 31, RUC 7 and UDR 1). Of this total (39), 22 were killed in twelve separate covert operations. This comprised 19 insurgents; 1 member of the UVF; 1 innocent civilian bystander (Protestant); and 1 E4 HMSU officer.
140. 22 people killed in 12 separate incidents (17 PIRA, 1 IPLO, 1 INLA, 1 UVF, 1 E4 HMSU and 1 civilian).
141. Ellison and Smyth, *The Crowned Harp*, and John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland* (London: Palgrave, 2002).
142. Ní Aoláin, *The Politics of Force*, 55 and 59.
143. Taylor, *Brits*, 302.
144. Brian Feeney, *Insider: Gerry Bradley's Life in the IRA* (Dublin: O'Brien Press, 2009), 234 and Jack Holland and Susan Phoenix, *Phoenix: Policing the Shadows—The Secret War Against Terrorism in Northern Ireland* (Edinburgh: Hodder & Stoughton, 1996), 266.
145. The injuries refer to Northern Ireland only. See CAIN <http://cain.ulster.ac.uk/ni/security.htm#05> (accessed 4 March 2013).
146. Henry McDonald, “Irish Dissident Groups thwarted by surveillance technology: Former IRA hunger striker Gerard Hodgins says British have ‘permanent eyes and ears’ inside terrorist organisation,” *The Guardian* (28 January 2014). <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/28/irish-dissident-groups-thwarted-surveillance-hunger-striker-hodgins> (accessed 29 Jan 2014).
147. Major, *John Major*, 431.
148. Alan Barker *Shadows: Inside Northern Ireland's Special Branch* (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2004), 233–238.
149. Arthur Aughey, “The Art and Effect of Political Lying in Northern Ireland.” *Irish Political Studies* 17, no. 2 (2002): 1–16. Also see David Mitchell, “Cooking the Fudge: Constructive Ambiguity and the Implementation of the Northern Ireland Agreement, 1998–2007,” *Irish Political Studies* 24, no. 3 (September 2009): 321–336.
150. Tony Blair, *Tony Blair: A Journey* (London: Hutchinson, 2010), Jonathan Powell, *Great Hatred, Little Room. Making Peace in Northern Ireland* (London: Vintage Books, 2009) and Mowlam, *Momentum: The Struggle for Peace, Politics and the People* (London: Cornet Books, 2003). Also see George J. Mitchell, *Making Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).
151. Speech by Peter Hain MP, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (12 June 2007), found at the CAIN archive website, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/nio/ph120607.pdf> (accessed 12 March 2014).
152. Eamon O’Kane, “Learning From Northern Ireland? The Uses and Abuses of the ‘Irish Model’,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2 (2010): 239–256. O’Kane writes that the “Irish” model has enabled politicians to increase their political profile on the world stage but that exporting the model without a proper overall context is more about inspiring others than providing tangible help. O’Kane shows that the Northern Ireland Model excludes security.

153. Paul Routledge, *John Hume* (London: HarperCollins, 1997), Garret Fitzgerald, *All in a Life: Garret Fitzgerald, An Autobiography* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1991), Bertie Ahern, *Bertie Ahern: The Autobiography* (London: Arrow Books, 2010) and Bill Clinton, *My Life* (London: Arrow Books, 2005).
154. Bill Clinton, *My Life* (London: Arrow Books, 2005).
155. Nuala O'Loan, *Statement by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland on her investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Raymond McCord Junior and related matters* (Belfast: Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, 2007), 145. Can be found on the Office of the Police Ombudsman website at <http://www.policeombudsman.org>
156. On the BBC 1 Northern Ireland News, 11 November 2014, former PSNI (Police Service of Northern Ireland) Assistant Chief Constable Peter Sheridan OBE complained to a Northern Ireland Select Affairs Committee in the House of Commons that OPONI had not treated the OTR issue fairly and produced an imbalanced report. Sheridan was central to the report's investigation but he was never interviewed by OPONI. See BBC News Northern Ireland, 'On the Run Watchdog report on scheme was "unfair,"' found at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-30008159> (accessed 14 Nov 2014). For a copy of the OPONI report see the OPONI website, found at <http://www.policeombudsman.org> (accessed 12 Nov 2014).
157. See <http://www.tonyblairoffice.org> (accessed 8 June 2014) and also, "Sinn Fein MP Conor Murphy for Colombian Peace initiative" 31 May 2013, found at <http://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/23118> (accessed 8 June 2014).
158. Damien McElroy, "Martin McGuinness will lead Iraq peace mission," *The Telegraph* (29 April 2008). <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1912171/Martin-McGuinness-will-lead-Iraq-peace-mission.html> (accessed 22 June 2014).
159. TJI is the intellectual centre of gravity post-conflict. Contemporary conflict-related literature is drawn to it the TJI outlook. Some examples are Ron Dudai, "Informers and the Transition in Northern Ireland," *The British Journal of Criminology*, 2012, 52, 32–54, and TJI (Transitional Justice Institute), *The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability* (Belfast: TJI at UUJ, 2013).
160. CAJ (Committee on the Administration of Justice), *War on Terror: Lessons from Northern Ireland* (Belfast: CAJ, 2008).
161. McGarry and O'Leary, *The Northern Ireland Conflict*, 378.
162. O'Leary's professional credentials and list of his literature are found on-line at Penn Arts and Sciences, Political Science Department, Brendan O'Leary, <http://www.sas.upenn.edu/polisci/people/standing-faculty/brendan-oleary> (accessed 3 June 2014). The commission referred to is, Chris Patten (Chairman), *A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland: The Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland* (Norwich: HMSO, 1999).
163. Brendan O'Leary, "Mission Accomplished? Looking back at the IRA," *Field Day Review* (2005), 218–246, 246.
164. Louise Richardson, "Britain and the IRA" in Robert Art and Louise Richardson, eds., *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons From the Past* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2007), 97.
165. See Frank Kitson (Major), *Gangs and Counter-gangs* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960), Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1971), and Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five* (London: Faber & Faber, 1977).

166. Urban, *Big Boys' Rules*, 37. Illustrating how the accusation endures, Susan McKay, *Bear in Mind these Dead* (London: Faber and Faber, 2008), 25, repeats well-worn "counter-gang" claims by Martin Dillon, *Dirty War*, Chapter Two, Tony Geraghty, *The Irish War*, 137, and Ellison and Smyth *The Crowned Harp*, 136–144.

167. Illustrating how this endures, Susan McKay, *Bear in Mind these Dead* (London: Faber and Faber, 2008), 25, repeats well-worn "counter-gang" claims by Martin Dillon, *Dirty War*, Chapter Two, Tony Geraghty, *The Irish War*, 137, and Ellison and Smyth *The Crowned Harp*, 136–144.

168. Statement of General Sir Frank Edward Kitson (Exhibit CK 1), 18 Oct 2001 found at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103930/http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/evidence-index/> (accessed 6 April 2013). Also, the criterion for counter-gangs that Derek Franklin, *The Pied Cloak: Memoirs of a Colonial Police (Special Branch) Officer* (London: Janus, 2006), 100, and Andrew Mumford, *The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare* (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 58, broadly describe do not fit the accusations and is nothing like anything that actually occurred.

169. Andrew Mumford, *The Counterinsurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare* (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), and Derek Franklin, *The Pied Cloak: Memoirs of a Colonial Police (Special Branch) Officer* (London: Janus, 2006).

170. Cadwallader, *Lethal Allies*, 12–14 (excludes 42 killings in Ireland).

171. Henry Patterson, *Ireland's Violent Frontier*, 193, lists 178 Protestants killed in Fermanagh/South Tyrone between 1971 and 1989 only 14 of which resulted in the perpetrators being successfully convicted.

172. Peter Foster, "Officials 'turned blind eye' to Pat Finucane killing," *Telegraph* (16 May 2013).

173. Cadwallader, *Lethal Allies*, 362.

174. Urban, *Big Boys' Rules*, 59.

175. De Silva, *The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review*, 95.

176. For a chronology of the Stevens investigations (1, 11 and 111) and connected events see the CAIN website at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk>

177. John Stevens, *Not for the Faint-hearted: My Life Fighting Crime* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005), 169. Also see Alan Simpson, *Duplicity and Deception: Policing the Twilight Zone of the Troubles* (Dublin: Brandon, 2010). Simpson is a retired CID Detective Superintendent who claims he would have convicted Finucane's killers had SB given him all the intelligence. De Silva, *The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review*, 429–452, qualifies Simpson's claim when it touches on the shortcomings of Simpson's investigation, which is largely glossed over in Simpson's account.

178. De Silva, *The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review*, 95, states, "However, I can certainly infer from the available material that there is no evidence to suggest that, in the late 1980s the security forces were institutionally biased in seeking to bring charges against republican paramilitaries as opposed to loyalists. On the contrary, the actions of the authorities in charging, prosecuting and imprisoning loyalist terrorists during the late 1980s in my view seriously undermines any simplistic notion that loyalist terrorists should be regarded as an extension of the State."

179. Stevens, "Overview and Recommendations," 4.7, considered the RUC as performing "conventional roles and duties are overlaid with the need to respond to the ever-present threat from terrorism," found at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/stevens3/stevens3summary.htm> (accessed 28 Nov 2012). Also see Stevens, *Not for the Faint-Hearted*, 168.

180. Public Prosecution Service (PPS), “Statement by the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland in Relation to Decisions as to Prosecution Arising out of the Stevens III Investigation” (Belfast Chambers, 2007). The statement can be found at the PPS website, <http://www.ppsni.gov.uk>
181. See “Statements by the family of Pat Finucane, Amnesty International and the NI Human Rights Commission” (25 June 2007), found at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/docs/group/pat_finucane_centre/pfc_finucane_250607.pdf (accessed 21 July 2013).
182. Stevens, “Overview and Recommendations,” 4.7, found at <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/stevens3/stevens3summary.htm> (accessed 28 Nov 2012).
183. Peter Cory, *Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Patrick Finucane* (London: Stationary Office, 2004), 18.
184. Ellison and Smyth, *The Crowned Harp*, 134.
185. Letter sent to OPONI 20 August 2010. Author’s PhD research.
186. Vincent Kearney, “PSNI officer who protested at the term collusion is re-employed,” *BBC Northern Ireland News* (29 Nov 2011). <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-15952518> (accessed 4 Dec 2012).
187. Eveleigh, *Peace-Keeping in a Democratic Society*, 77–78.
188. The Smithwick Tribunal into allegations of Garda collusion in 2013 found Cory’s appreciation of intelligence somewhat inept, which is reasonable to correlate to Cory not having framed the proper context. See Stephen Dempster, “Lord Trimble calls for inquiry into Lord and Lady Gibson’s murders,” *BBC Northern Ireland News* (27 May 2014). <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27582049> (accessed 15 June 2014).
189. United Nations Office on Drugs Crime (UNODC), *Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism* (New York: United Nations Publication, 2009), 53.
190. Crawford, *Inside the UDA*, 110.
191. Cusack and McDonald, *UVF*, 263. Johnny “Mad Dog” Adair was a particularly prominent loyalist who emerged post-Stevens. He is credited with controlling a vicious UDA/UFF campaign in Belfast. For further reading see, Henry McDonald and Jim Cusack, *UDA: Inside the Heart of Loyalist Terror* (Dublin: Penguin Ireland, 2004) and, David Lister and Hugh Jordan, *Mad Dog: The Rise and fall of Johnny Adair and ‘C’ Company* (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2004).
192. See McKittrick et al, *Lost Lives*, 1554, the five years prior to Stevens (1985–1989) loyalists were responsible for 84 murders, the five years after (1990–1994) the figure was 186, an increase of 221 percent.
193. Author’s PhD research identifies the five killings of suspected “informers” from 1990 to 1997 involved Protestant males with an average age of 33 years, the oldest being 49 years. Johnny Adair was 26 years in 1989. Of the five persons killed, two are accredited with providing information to the Security Forces that caused the arrests of loyalist paramilitaries and the recovery of weapons and munitions, and another is described as a senior figure.
194. Ian S. Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 155.
195. Malachi O’Doherty, *The Trouble With Guns: Republican Strategy and the Provisional IRA* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1998), 92, and Peter Taylor, *Loyalists*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 210 and 234, recognize the upsurge in loyalist violence, with the latter claiming that in the early 1990s it was a critical factor in influencing the PIRA’s ceasefire, without connecting it to Stevens III.

196. U. Hoffrage and R. Pohl, *Hindsight Bias: A Special Issue of Memory* (Champlain, NY: Psychology Press, 2003).

197. Onora O'Neill, *A Question of Trust: The BBC Reith Lectures 2002* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57.

198. At a conference in Belfast (1 July 2014) the Police Ombudsman Dr. Michael Maguire states that no OPONI investigator involved in a historic case has an RUC background, which means none have any experience or expertise of policing an irregular war. All investigators from a Police background are from mainland UK Police Services. Equally, OPONI vacancy bulletins for investigators into historic cases prohibit anyone who was in the RUC between 1969 and 1998 from applying, seeing this as an Article 2 issue relating to conducting an investigation into killings by the state. That is, to include a former RUC officer would jeopardise the integrity of the investigation.

199. Michael Morland (Chairman), *The Rosemary Nelson Inquiry Report* (London: Stationary Office, 2011). Also see, "Rosemary Nelson inquiry to publish findings on 23 May," *Guardian*, (9 May 2011). <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/may/09/rosemary-nelson-inquiry-report-date> (accessed 15 Jan 2013).

200. Ginger Thompson, "South Africa Pay \$3,900 to each Family of Apartheid Victims," *New York Times* (16 April 2003). <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/16/world/south-africa-to-pay-3900-to-each-family-of-apartheid-victims.html> (accessed 8 March 2014). The Sterling (£) figure is based on a 1.6 exchange rate with the US dollar. A lesser figure is provided in, Volume One, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (1998), 308, which states 70 million Rand was the approved budget for the Commission, which is approximately \$8 million for the fiscal year 1995 (approx. \$48 million over the six years estimated from \$8 million per year), found at <http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume%201.pdf> (accessed 28 Jan 2013).

201. An organizational framework was already in place as a legacy of counter-societies in which a culture of claim, litigation and general hostility against the State was the norm.

202. Cadwallader's claims in *Lethal Allies* were promoted in an exclusive nine-minute long report on Channel 4's national Television news (23 October 2013) and also by the national broadcaster (RTE) in the Republic of Ireland. BBC TV and Radio in Northern Ireland also carried comprehensive coverage, as did the main Northern Ireland newspaper (*Belfast Telegraph*). In contrast, published in the same year was Patterson's *Ireland's Violent Frontier*, which does not subscribe to the Dirty War thesis. It merited several paragraphs in a regional newspaper (*The Newsletter*). Even though Cadwallader repackaged what was already in the public domain it was more appealing as a news story than Patterson having introduced new facts from previously unseen archives. And, as already mentioned. There is a large intellectual appetite for Dirty War-type research, predominantly via TJI.

203. See Chris Ryder, *Fighting Fitt* (Brehon Press: Belfast, 2006) and Paddy Devlin, *Straight Left* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1993). Another common occurrence was PSF accusing Catholic priests of supporting the British because they spoke out against PIRA violence. One example of this refers to a PSF publication by "Clonard Martyrs Sinn Fein Cumann, Falls Road, Belfast" (15 Aug 1976) aimed at Father Murphy of St. Michael's (author's PhD research). Similar intolerance is on display following the arrest of Gerry Adams in 2014 for the murder of Jean McConville in 1972. On 7 Dec 1972 in Belfast Jean McConville (37 years, Catholic, civilian, widow with 14 children) was abducted from her home and shot in the head by the provisional PIRA for supposedly comforting an injured soldier and being a suspected British Army informer. Her body was secretly buried in the Republic of Ireland and not found until 2003. See McKittrick et al, *Lost Lives*, 301. Outraged at Adams' arrest, Martin McGuinness claimed, "there was still a dark side within policing," see "Gerry Adams Arrest: Sinn Féin claims 'dark side' to

NI policing,” *BBC News Northern Ireland* (1 May 2014). <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-27244878> (accessed 11 June 2014). The gist of McGuinness’s criticism is that, this type of person was and remains an impediment to peace. Sinn Féin clearly believes this narrative is still a vote-catcher.

204. Rebecca Black, “Outrage at ‘Provo heroes’ comment,” *News Letter*, (4 July 2013), front page and page 12. Martin McGuinness promoted the PIRA peacemakers claim in praising PIRA’s activities in Londonderry as “a very proud and honourable struggle” wherein insurgents “were the real heroes.” See Rebecca Black, “Outrage at ‘Provo heroes’ comment,” *News Letter*, (4 July 2013), front page and page 12. Connectedly, Sinn Féin politician Barry McIllduff represents the republican viewpoint that sees PIRA ‘volunteers’ who were killed whilst attempting to murder others as “victims” and criticizes the BBC for repeating British propaganda (the criminalization policy) that treated them as criminals. Sinn Féin MLA (Member of the Legislative Assembly) Barry McIllduff was interviewed by Stephen Nolan on the Nolan Show on *BBC Radio Ulster* (6 August 2013). For Sinn Féin the RUC and British Army are the terrorists. In the same vein, Margaret Ritchie (former leader of the SDLP) regards the RUC and SB as the real villains, describing them as “rotten to the core.” See “Margaret Ritchie wants ombudsman Hutchinson resignation,” *BBC News Northern Ireland* (24 June 2011). <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-13899085> (accessed 9 April 2013).

205. Interview with former SB officer Afghanistan 2010.

206. Paul Dixon, Paul, “Bew and Frampton: Recognisably Neoconservative,” *Political Quarterly* 83, no. 2 (2012): 283–286, 285.

207. John Bew and Martin Frampton, “Debating the ‘Stalemate’: A Response to Dr. Dixon,” *Political Quarterly* 83, no. 2:2012): 277–282, and John Bew, Martin Frampton and Inigo Gurruchago, *Talking to Terrorists: Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

208. Mary-Alice, C. Clancy, *Peace without Consensus: Power Sharing Politics in Northern Ireland* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010).

209. Clancy, *Peace Without Consensus*, 185.

210. John Bew, “Mass, Methods, and Means: The Northern Ireland ‘Model’ of Counterinsurgency,” in Martin David Jones, Celeste Ward Gventer and M. L. R. Smith, eds., *The New Counter-Insurgency Era in Critical Perspective* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 169.

211. See Arthur Aughey, “The Art and Effect of Political Lying in Northern Ireland,” *Irish Political Studies* 17, no. 2 (2002): 1–16. Also see David Mitchell, “Cooking the Fudge: Constructive Ambiguity and the Implementation of the Northern Ireland Agreement, 1998–2007,” *Irish Political Studies* 24, no. 3 (September 2009): 321–336.

212. Interview with General Petraeus, author’s research, Kabul 2010.

213. Figures from author’s PhD research. The Northern figure relates to the immediate period after internment in 1971 and the US figure, provided by General Petraeus, relates to 2007.